The American Defeat at Quebec
Anthony Nardini
Department of History
Villanova University
Edited by Cynthia
Kaschub
We were walking alongside the St. Lawrence River,
along a roadway choked with cars. The
small sidewalk was slick, covered in ice, the blustery wind pushing us down the
street. I had thought the road would
eventually lead back to the heart of the city, but I was wrong. We had become lost in Quebec, stuck between
the great cliff the city was built upon and the river. It was here that I first became aware of what
had transpired here over two hundred twenty-five years ago. A large plaque, attached to the facing rock,
celebrated the bravery of the Canadians who pushed back American General
Montgomery and his Rebel force. I
wondered just what had happened at this very spot. What had happened to Montgomery and his
men? Why were there Americans attacking
Quebec City?
Cause for
Invasion
On June 16, 1775, just two months after the clash at
Lexington and Concord, the First Continental Congress appointed George
Washington as “General & Commander in Chief of the
American Forces.”[1] By September 14, 1775, the day Washington
gave orders to Colonel Benedict Arnold to “take Command of the Detachment from
the Continental Army against Quebeck,” American
forces had already seized Ticonderoga and Crown Point in New York.[2] Earlier in September, an army of 2,000 under
Brigadier General Richard Montgomery began to push towards Forts St. Jean and Chambly, in Canadian territory. The Americans were now poised for a full
invasion of Canada, fueled by Washington’s belief, as stated by Donald Barr Chidsey, that, “the best defense is an offense and that it
is best to keep your enemy off balance.”[3] Controlling the Hudson and the Richelieu-Lake
Champlain region would prevent the British from splitting the colonies in
two. The knowledge that the opposing
British forces in Canada “consisted of 800 regulars divided among a number of
different posts” made it even more prudent to seize the initiative and invade.[4] But it was more than just military strategy
that necessitated an invasion of Canada.
A combination of propaganda,
libertarian fervor, and misinformed beliefs energized the Americans to
invade. It was believed that the entirety
of Quebec felt the same oppression as Americans felt in Boston and that the
Canadians would welcome the Americans as liberators. The passage of the Quebec
Act incensed many English-speaking Canadians.
The act enlarged the province to include the Great Lakes, the area of
land north of the Ohio River to the Mississippi, the Mississippi to its source,
and the Great Lakes to Hudson Bay territory.
This land was then consigned to the fur trade and the Indians.[5] The act also promised more religious tolerance:
namely the freedom to practice Roman Catholicism along with a new oath of
allegiance that allowed Catholics to participate in government and hold office.
American outrage was due to the
restrictions on land and the pro-Papist sentiment. English speaking merchants were now alienated
in Canada which country?—non-English people were now able to become part of the
government without losing their identity.[6] Congress, along with the Committee of
Correspondence, sent both letters and Patriots to Canada to assess and sway
public opinion. The provisional congress
of New York sent north a “batch of letters . . . appealing to Canadians across
the border to join them in the struggle for liberty.”[7] Customs officer Thomas Ainslie, who later
volunteered to defend Quebec, took note of the attempt to win Canadians over to
the American cause: “The Agents & friends of the Congress had not been
idle—by word & by writing they had poison’d their
minds—they were brought to believe that the Minister had laid a plan to enslave
them.”[8]
II.
The Passage to Quebec
Washington, the new
commander-in-chief, took the “tatterdemalion mob” that was the Continental Army
and formed it into a disciplined unit, “teaching then to drill like soldiers,
arming them adequately, getting them into proper uniforms, and enforcing the
rudiments of sanitation.”[9] At Washington’s headquarters at Cambridge,
Arnold called for volunteers for his expedition from Washington’s troops, and
was met with a tremendous response, though Washington agreed to send only
eleven hundred men to Quebec. Seven
hundred and forty-seven New Englanders were given to Arnold, along with three
companies of riflemen from Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.[10] Private John Joseph Henry, a mere boy of
sixteen, noted the differences between the two groups: “The principal
distinction between us, was in our dialects, our arms,
and our dress. It was the silly fashion of those times, for riflemen to ape the
manners of savages.”[11] Regional prejudices and distrust would later
become a factor in the campaign.
The route Arnold was to follow came from a map and
journal Lt. John Montresor, a British officer,
charted in 1761.
The route led from the Kennebeck River of Maine through an uninhabited wilderness called
the Height of Land. From there they
would travel down the Chaudière River towards Quebec,
crossing overland to the St. Lawrence River. The troops would cross the river,
appearing just outside the walls of Quebec on the Plains of Abraham. It was an audacious plan, seeking to surprise
the British by taking a lesser-known route.
The British would be more prepared for Montgomery’s force, which took
the easier way up Lake Champlain to the Richelieu, and then up the St.
Lawrence. Arnold would soon learn that Montresor’s journal and map contained flaws, and his
invasion force would not have the easy time that Montresor
and his small scout party experienced.
The expedition touched off from Newburyport on
September 18, traveling north-by-northeast aboard the sloops Commander, Britannia, Conway, Abigail, and
Swallow, and the schooners Houghton, Eagle, Hannah, and Broad Bay.[12] It traveled to the mouth of the Kennebeck River. The trip was expected to be dangerous, as
the Patriots had to run past British warships enforcing an embargo against the
colonies.[13] The real problem was with the ships, which
caused much sickness for the men, and only allowed them as far as Gardinerstown, on the coast of Maine. The men then traveled to Fort Western
(present day Augusta, Maine), nearly forty miles from the sea up the Kennebec
River. Arnold’s men would now have to travel down the Kennebec on their newly
made bateaux. Prior to the expedition
Arnold had ordered two hundred of them from a local shipwright, Reuben
Colburn. The flat-bottomed riverboats,
with flared sides and tapered bows and sterns, measured from eighteen to
twenty-five feet long and weighed nearly four hundred pounds apiece.[14] Arnold wrote to Washington that he found “the
Batteaus completed, but many of them smaller than the
Directions given, & very badly built.”[15] The expedition was delayed as Arnold ordered
improvements made to his bateaux. This
was just the first unexpected halt, a setback for Arnold’s invasion timetable,
which estimated the invasion to take twenty days.
The troops were able to land at Ft. Western without
much difficulty, where Arnold sent out forward scouts and formed his army. Arnold broke them into four divisions,
sending the riflemen, under the command of Daniel Morgan, to clear the way. On September 26, they were followed by the
second division under Colonel Christopher Greene. Major Return Meigs
commanded the third division, which followed Greene the next day. Colonel Roger Enos,
who brought up the rear with the supplies, led the fourth division.[16]
Arnold, traveling ahead in a lighter, more dependable
birch-bark canoe, met with the forward elements of his force at Fort
Halifax. Later they moved on through a
waterfall at Skowhegan. Arnold arrived
at Norridgewock by Saturday, October 2.
It was here that Arnold’s men began to face greater challenges, which
would lead to problems further into the wilderness. Isaac Senter, a New
Hampshire doctor now in the army as a surgeon, witnessed the problems with the
bateaux as they were moved over the portages: “Many of our bateaux were nothing
but wrecks . . .a quantity of dry cod fish, by this
time was received, as likewise a number of barrels of dry bread. The fish lying loose in the
bateaux, and being continually washed with the fresh water running into the
bateaux. The bread casks not
being waterproof, admitted the water in plenty . . .soured
the whole bread. We were now curtailed
of a very valuable and large part of our provisions.”[17] The army was delayed almost a week at
Norridgewock, “drying out their supplies, throwing out bad food, and getting
around the treacherous portage.”[18] Having not even left the area of Maine,
Arnold was now delayed two weeks due to faulty boats and poor handling. Arnold’s handpicked men, who were supposed to
be accustomed to boats and their operation, turned out to be novices.
The army was finally back on
the move on October 9 and by the eleventh had reached the “Great Carrying
Place,” which led to the Dead River. The
army would have to carry their supplies and equipment over a twelve-mile
portage, spaced by three ponds. The
portages began to take a toll on the men, as Dr. Senter
remarked, “the army was now much fatigued, being obliged to carry all the
bateaus, barrels of provisions, warlike stores, &c., over on their backs
through a most terrible piece of woods conceivable.”[19] The labor and fatigue, coupled with a diet of
heavily salted meat, drove the men to thirst, sucking down quantities of
brackish, stagnant water from the ponds: “Water was quite yellow . . . No
sooner had it got down than it was puked up by many of the poor fellows.”[20]
Arnold called for a blockhouse to be built for the sick. On October 16 the army broke camp, leaving
the seriously ill at the hospital.
Food was beginning to become a problem for the
army. Arnold wrote to Washington that he
had “twenty five Days Provissions for the whole
Detachment.”[21] Arnold ordered a yoke of oxen from the rear
forward, which were subsequently butchered.
The men, on half-rations, tried to fish and hunt, but increasing rain
made it difficult. Arnold originally
welcomed the rain, since it raised the low-running Dead River “upwards of three
feet,” making it easier to navigate.[22] He did not know of the problems the immense
rainfall would cause.
On the evening of Saturday, October 21, Arnold’s
fatigued, rain-soaked men built fires and tried to dry themselves out before
they went to sleep. At about 4:00 A.M.
on Sunday morning, they were awakened by “the freshet which came rushing on us
like a torrent, having rose 8 feet perpendicular in 9 hours.”[23] The Dead River had flooded, soaking both the
men and their baggage. The men scrambled
to the top of a nearby hill, salvaging what little they could. Arnold assessed the situation: “The Country
road entirely overflowed, so that the course of the river, being crooked, could
not be discovered, which with the rapidity of the current renders it almost
impossible for the Battoes to ascend the River, or
the men to find their way by land or pass the small brooks. Add to this our Provisions almost exhausted,
& the incessant rains for three days has prevented our gaining anything
considerable, so that we have but a melancholy prospect before us, but in
general high spirits.”[24] Arnold was now faced with a growing crisis,
despite the “general high spirits.”
Supplies were low, the soldiers were weak, and there was no word from
any of his contacts in Canada.
Arnold called on his officers to debate their next
move. Now was the time to decide whether
to press on or fall back. The officers
decided to press on. The worst of the
wilderness was now behind them and supplies would be available at Sartigan. Word was
sent to the rear for Greene and Enos to bring only
“as many men as they could feed for fifteen days,” lightening the burden and
quickening their pace.[25] Arnold urged his men on, to within twenty
miles of Chaudière Pond.
But Arnold was faced with another problem. Roger Enos,
Arnold’s second-in-command, met with Colonel Greene, suggesting the invasion
was a lost cause and urging others to follow him back in retreat. Dr. Senter, who was
present at the meeting, noted that Enos “had been
preaching to their men the doctrine of impenetrability and non-perseverance.”[26] Though the vote was in favor of continuing, Enos’s men said they would go back to Cambridge
anyway. Enos,
obliged to follow his men, returned with them.[27] Not only did Enos
and his men do what amounted to mutiny, they also took more than their share of
provisions from the rear supply train, sending up no more “than two and a half
barrels of flour” before their departure.[28] Their treachery, along with their pilfering
of supplies, inflamed and angered Arnold’s remaining men. Captain Henry
Dearborn best described this feeling: “Our men made a General Prayer, that
Colonel Enos and all his men, might die by the way,
or meet with some disaster, Equal to the Cowardly dastardly and unfriendly
Spirit they discover’d in returning Back without
orders, in such a manner as they had done.”[29] Enos would later be
arrested and court-martialed, though he was acquitted.
Arnold was now left with six hundred seventy-five men
to storm Quebec. On Friday, October 27
Arnold crossed down from the Height of Land and found hope from a small
scouting party he had sent ahead earlier.
The scouts reported the inhabitants of Sartigan
appeared “very friendly & rejoiced to hear of our approach.”[30] Arnold was also encouraged by reports that
there were few troops defending Quebec.
Later that day Arnold reached Lake Mégantic,
where he awaited the rest of his men. He
sent a letter to Washington apologizing for his slowness and detailing his lack
of supplies. Arnold still expected to reach Sartigan “in three or four Days, in order to procure a
Supply of Provissions.”[31]
His half-starved men soon followed through the snow
over the Height of Land. Dr. Senter, having only to
eat “the jawbone of a swine destitute of any covering,” was still encouraged by
the ease of a few crossings, due to their lack of supplies.[32] The last of the food was distributed to the
men as they became lost in the bogs and streams leading up to the Chaudière. Arnold
and his staff were nearly crushed in their canoe by the rapids. As the men were pushed to the brink, they
began to reach a low point which Dr. Senter described
as “the zenith of distress.”[33] Captain Dearborn’s dog, who had accompanied
the men on the entire excursion, was sacrificed and eaten, leaving Dearborn
“very unwell.”[34] Private Abner
Stocking described a “fatigue and anxiety” so great that he was “little
refreshed by the last night of sleep.”[35] Driven by fatigue and hunger, the men were
forced to eat “shaving soap, pomatum, and even the lip salve, leather of their
shoes, cartridge boxes, &c.”[36]
Upon reaching Sartigan on
October 30, ahead of the rest of the army, Arnold immediately sent back cattle
for his starved, weary men. Dr. Senter heard “echoes of gladness” resound “from front to
rear” upon the approach of the cattle.[37] The army soon reached Canada and was
surprised by the “politeness and civility with which the poor Canadians
received” them.[38] The men rested and enjoyed the hospitality of
the habitants, having experienced
extreme privation and pain during their journey. They soon disembarked for Quebec, moving
quickly along the Chaudière River. By daybreak on November 7, Morgan’s riflemen
had reached the shore opposite Quebec.[39]
III.
Outside the Walls
With his army forming just across the St. Lawrence at
Pointe de Lévis, Arnold wanted to make a move on
Quebec. In a letter to General
Montgomery, who had taken Fort Chambly on November 3
and was now pressing towards Montreal, Arnold stated, “I am informed by the
French, that there are two frigates and several armed vessels lying before
Quebec, and a large ship or two lately arrived from Boston. However, I propose crossing the St. Lawrence
as soon as possible.”[40] Arnold would have to wait to cross, however,
since his rear was still coming to Pointe de Lévis
and “the wind has been so high these three nights past.”[41] To pass the time, Arnold ordered his men to
prepare ladders and pikes to clear the walls.
On November 13, the wind dropped and, with a thick
cover of clouds, the Americans began moving across the river in canoes. Arnold guided the first wave through a gap in
between the sloop-of-war HMS Hunter and
the frigate HMS Lizard, who had been
patrolling the river.[42]
In seven hours, Arnold moved five hundred of his force to the Plains of
Abraham, leaving a rear guard of sixty at Pointe Lévis.[43] On the night of the fifteenth, Arnold made an
attempt to draw the guardians of Quebec into a fight. Captain Ainslie described the scene: “A body
of men appear’d on the heights of Abraham within 800
yards of the walls of Quebec; they huzza’d thrice—we answer’d them with three cheers of defiance, & saluted
them with a few cannon loaded with grape & canister shot—they did not wait
for a second round.”[44]
Arnold remained inactive in front of Quebec for six
days, sending demands for surrender that were received “contrary to humanity
and the laws of nations.”[45] Arnold’s messengers were jailed and drummed
out of the city. He had neither the men
nor the supplies, as he wrote Montgomery, “Upon, examination, great part of our
cartridges proved unfit for service, and to my great surprise we had no more
than five rounds for each man, and near one hundred guns unfit for
service. Add to this many of the men
invalids, and almost naked and wanting everything to make them comfortable.”[46] Arnold was beginning to see the effects of
the journey on his army and its ability to fight. He knew he took too long but was still
optimistic the city could be taken: “Had I been ten days sooner, Quebec must
inevitably have fallen into our hands, as there was not a man then to oppose
us. However I make no doubt Gen.
Montgomery will reduce it this winter.”[47]
Arnold pulled back with his men to Point aux Trembles,
twenty miles from Quebec, on November 19.
Arnold had learned “Col. McClean was making
preparations, and had determined in a day or two to come out and attack us.”[48] Arnold believed his force, now down to five
hundred and fifty effectives, would not have been able to fight. The men settled into the houses and barns of
the habitants (a French-Canadian or Quebecuois), dining well
and keeping warm. Arnold sent to
Montgomery for more supplies as his “hard cash” was “nearly exhausted,” and his
men would need proper clothing for the coming Canadian winter.[49] As Arnold and his men sat
at Pointe aux Trembles awaiting the arrival of Montgomery, the guns of Quebec
fired in salute to the arrival of Lieutenant General Guy Carleton, Governor of
Canada.
IV.
Defending Quebec
Prior to the arrival of Carleton, the outlook of the
citizens of Quebec was bleak. Captain
Ainslie described the proceedings of a town meeting in Quebec, as the citizens
began to fear the rebel force just miles from their homes: “Our force is small
indeed, theirs is now great & it increases daily—let us be prudent—let us
remain neuter—let us secure with our effects good treatment from the friends of
Liberty, for they will sooner or later take the town; if we attempt to hold out
our ruin is unavoidable. Why suffer our property to be destroyed.”[50] Those who had opposed the Quebec Act were now
stirring up trouble, attempting to sway others to resist the British
government, though not to the point of open aggression. Subsequently, some habitants refused to show up for militia duty. The pro-British citizens
feared spies were all around the city; Lieutenant-Governor Hector Cramahé ordered the gates closed at six every night.
Help soon arrived in early November, as the frigate Lizard “dropped anchor, bringing arms,
specie, and a shipment of green and buff uniforms for the Quebec militia.”[51] One hundred volunteers from Newfoundland,
commanded by Captain Malcolm Fraser of the Royal Highland Emigrants, arrived on
board Lizard. The most welcome addition to the city’s
garrison was the arrival of Colonel Allan MacLean and his veteran corps of
Royal Highland Emigrants. Cramahé, though praised by Ainslie as “indefatigable in
putting the town in a proper state of defence,” was
more of a pen pusher than a warrior.[52] “A feeble old man,” he was happy to give
power to MacLean.[53]
MacLean went into action upon his arrival, breaking up
a debate in a bishop’s chapel over surrender.
He tolerated no less in discipline and soon had all ranks at work,
digging trenches, building gun platforms, and strengthening walls. He ordered the cathedral bell to be rung only
to warn of danger. He frightened
property owners by declaring nothing would be safe if the rebels took the
city. His work and warnings helped to
strengthen and unite the citizens.[54]
The outlook of the city improved even more on November
19. Carleton, disguised as a habitant and aided by his ability to
speak French, slipped through the American lines near Pointe aux Trembles and
met the snow[55] Fell, which sailed him up to the Quebec.[56]
He had escaped from Montreal, knowing his presence was much needed to solidify
any hopes of defending the city. Ainslie
recognized the importance of Carleton’s arrival, seeing “our salvation in his
presence.”[57] Carleton, ignorant to the threat of an
invasion, had sent eight hundred men (half his force) to Boston in the fall of
1774.[58] He would now try to recover from this
mistake.
Carleton, three days after his arrival, issued an
edict that boded ill for the friends of the Americans inside the city. The edict forced all “useless, disloyal, and
treacherous persons” out of the city by forcing those “liable to serve in the
Militia,” to do so. Those that refused
were ordered out of the city by December 1, “under the pain of being treated as
rebels or spies.”[59] “Thus was our militia purged from all those
miscreants who had already taken arms with a design no doubt of turning them
against us when a fair opportunity shou’d offer,”
wrote Captain Ainslie. “Their expulsion
much strengthened the Garrison.”[60]
Carleton effectively eliminated any hopes of American collaboration inside the
city.
Carleton ordered for blockhouses to be repaired and gun
platforms installed and mounted.
Barricades were built at either end of the Lower Town to give his
untried troops protection. Two were built at Sault au Matelot
“on a narrow roadway that then enemy must follow when approaching from the
northeast, a third at Près de Ville, where the road
paralleling the St. Lawrence threaded past the face of Cape Diamond. At Près de Ville, a log building was loopholed
for muskets and armed with four small cannons.”[61] These barricades would play an important role
in the defense of the city, responsible for stopping the Americans in their
tracks.
With an embargo on the seaport, the two British
warships Lizard and Hunter were “hauled at high tide as far
as possible into the Cul-de-Sac and hove over against
the King’s Wharf for the winter.”[62] The sailors cleared the ships of all their
stores and weaponry and were ordered to garrison duty. The large naval guns were mounted on the
walls.
By Captain Ainslie’s account, the strength of the
garrison was eighteen hundred men, with five thousand inhabitants. He estimated provisions would last eight
months.[63]
Carleton
broke his men into four brigades or battle groups: regulars from the Royal
Highland Emigrants, the Fusiliers, and the marines, led by Colonel MacLean, who
was also second-in-command; the British militia under Lieutenant Colonel
Caldwell, whose home outside the city was taken by the Americans; the French
Canadian militia under Lieutenant Colonel Noel Voyer;
and the seamen, under Captain John Hamilton, master of Lizard.[64] Carleton was content to sit and wait for an
attack. Under his leadership, the
Americans were now facing a formidable foe.
V.
Preparing the Assault
On December 3, Montgomery and three
hundred men joined with Arnold at Pointe aux Trembles. Arnold was enthusiastic about the situation
inside the city, “which has a wretched, motley garrison of disaffected seamen,
marines and inhabitants, the walls in a ruinous situation, and cannot hold out
long.”[65] The next day, the combined force made their
way to Quebec, taking up their positions.
Montgomery made his headquarters two miles from St. John’s gate, close
to the Plains of Abraham, while Arnold set up in the suburb of St. Roch, just north of the city. Montgomery’s New Yorkers held the right of
the line near the St. Lawrence, while Morgan’s riflemen held the left near the
St. Charles in St. Roch. The line was stretched across, blocking all
roads in and out of the city.[66]
Montgomery’s
attempts at communicating surrender to Carleton under a flag of truce were met
with the same disdain as Arnold’s. He
attempted to frighten the citizens with letters shot over the walls, warning of
the destruction of the city if there was no surrender. None of these measures were successful.
Montgomery ordered batteries to be erected
along the American lines. Riflemen,
working through the streets and houses of St. Roch,
began sniping at sentries on the walls.
The people of Quebec first feared the guns of the Americans, conceiving
that “every shell wou’d inevitably kill a dozen or
two of people, & knock down some two or three house; some were in fears
about their tenements, but the greatest part were occupied about the safety of
their persons.” They were soon
surprised, however, at the ineffectiveness of the guns. As Ainslie recalled,
“They had anticipated much evil: but after they saw that their bombettes as they called them, did no harm, women and
children walked the street laughing at their former fears.”[67] Montgomery’s small nine- and twelve-pound
cannons struggled to cause any damage.
The besieged soon responded, pounding down American positions with their
larger guns, “returning 18 lb, 24 lb & 32 lb shot.”[68] With American artillery taking more damage
than it was inflicting, “It became apparent that the American batteries were
just not in a position to compete with those of the fortress, and the
efficiency of British counter-battery work was apparent from the casualties,
and damage suffered by the American guns and gunners.”[69]
Montgomery and Arnold knew they could
not perform a successful siege against Quebec.
The ground was frozen and thus too hard for trenches. American guns were incapable of damaging the
walls. The winter would be too rough on
the troops, even with the supplies Montgomery brought down from Montreal. Of greater concern were morale and
discipline—many soldiers were looking forward to the end of their enlistments,
which would expire on January 1, 1776.
John Joseph Henry noted the new feelings among the troops in camp: “The
patriotism of the summer of seventy-five, seemed almost extinguished in the
winter of seventy-six. The patriotic
officers made every exertion to induce enlistments but to no purpose.”[70] Congress began badgering Montgomery for some
results, sending a committee into Canada to assess the progress of the
campaign.[71]
Smallpox had also made its appearance in the American camp. Montgomery and Arnold saw their time running
out.
After one last attempt to force
Carleton’s surrender, it was deemed that Quebec must be attacked. Montgomery, appealing to their feelings of
liberty and the cause, swayed the New Englanders to fight despite their
expiring enlistments. Montgomery and
Arnold met with their officers and decided to attack at night during a
snowstorm.
On December 26,
after an uncelebrated Christmas, orders were given to ready pikes and ladders,
along with rifles and muskets.
Montgomery’s New Yorkers and four of Arnold’s companies were to attack
the bastion on the promontory of Cape Diamond, while the other troops under
Colonel Greene were to advance on the Lower Town. The men put sprigs of hemlock in their hats
to distinguish themselves from the enemy—the uniforms Montgomery brought from
Montreal were British scarlet. The
attack would be called off, however, after a clearing in the skies.[72] Montgomery did not want to risk storming the
city under such light.
Though it did not seem like it at the moment, the
clearing and subsequent postponement of the attack was a stroke of luck. A British prisoner had escaped from American
captivity and informed Carleton of the impending attack, which was confirmed by
an American deserter. Disaster was
averted, but Quebec was put on alert. “A thousand men were ready,” wrote
Captain Ainslie, “to oppose the Rebels in case of an attack; the rest of the
Garrison lay in their cloaths with their arms and
accoutrements lying by them.”[73] Montgomery rethought his attacking scheme,
devised another plan, and waited.
VI. The Failed Assault
The attack on Quebec would be a two-pronged
affair. Montgomery and his New Yorkers
would strike the Lower Town by moving alongside the St. Lawrence River at the
base of a cliff, below Cape Diamond.
Pushing past the guard towers and sentry posts, Montgomery’s men would
move to the staircase that leads to the Upper Town. Arnold’s men would approach from St. Roch and storm the Sault au Matelot
barricades. The two forces would link up
at the staircase, and drive their way up to take the town. Two feints would be made on the walls: a
force of Canadians, under Robert Livingston, would attempt to set fire to St.
John’s Gate, and about one hundred men under John Brown would demonstrate near
the guard post at Cape Diamond, setting off rockets to signal Arnold.[74]
On December 31, with the coming of a storm, Montgomery
decided it was time. The men formed at their designated stations and prepared
to move on the town. John Joseph Henry remembered the harsh conditions in which
they would attack: “The storm was outrageous, and the cold wind extremely
biting.”[75] The British, having been informed of their
attack by a deserter—“‘we shall certainly be attack’d
the first dark night’”—were prepared for the American assault.[76]
The Americans were spotted as soon as they moved
out. Captain Malcolm Fraser of the Royal
Emigrants, while on his rounds at 4 A.M., saw “many flashes of fire without
hearing any reports.” He subsequently “order’d the Guards and Pickets on the ramparts to stand to
their arms. The drums beat, the bells
rang the alarm, & in a few minutes the whole Garrison was under arms—even
old men of seventy went forward to oppose the attackers.”[77]
Montgomery, unaware that he had been spotted, led his
three hundred men along the riverbank.
Brown’s men set off the rockets and proceeded to engage the guards at
Cape Diamond. Livingston failed to set
the St. John’s gate afire. Montgomery’s
men were slowed by the chunks of ice strewn about, forcing them to use
time-consuming detours. The men slipped
and fell on the snow and ice along the route.
Montgomery, at the front of his men, came to the first
barricade, a row of posts stretching from the cliff to the water’s edge. Unchallenged, he continued to move close to
the cliff towards a log blockhouse which was held by a group of British sailors
and militia. Hearing noise coming from
the house, Montgomery decided to storm it before its defenders had enough time
to get ready. He drew his sword and
urged on his men. Less than fifty yards
from the house, the Royal Artillery officer in command of the blockhouse gave
the order to fire. A
cannon roared, spewing grapeshot at the Americans. It was followed by a fusillade of small arms
fire. Montgomery, along with his advance
party, was cut to pieces. Montgomery
died instantly.[78]
With Montgomery’s death, command of the column fell to
Colonel Donald Campbell. Lacking the
mettle and courage of Montgomery, Campbell conferred with the other officers
and ordered a retreat. It was an
indefensible move. The engagement had
not even started; the main force was not even in line yet. Montgomery was down, but the fight was not
finished. Arnold was depending on the
New Yorkers to be at the staircase for the final push. Campbell, unable to summon any nerve and
rally his men, succumbed to fear and fell back.
Having seen the rockets, Arnold moved his six hundred men
along the St. Charles. They soon moved
past the Palace Gate and drew fire from the city’s gunners. Private Henry saw “nothing but the blaze from
the muzzles of their muskets.”[79] The Americans were in no position to return
fire, and continued to press on to the docks and the first barricade at Sault
au Matelot.
Arnold paused to direct his men forward when he was hit in the leg, the
bullet lodging in his Achilles’ tendon.[80] He at first refused to be moved, propping
himself up with his sword and urging his men forward. He was taken back to the hospital once his
men passed.
Morgan assumed command and cleared the first barricade,
capturing more than one hundred prisoners.
While his men rounded them up, Morgan was guided to the next barricade,
whose gate was left open. Morgan saw the
barricade there for the taking, but his officers refused to move forward until
the rest of the men in the rear caught up.[81] The men Morgan’s officers had wanted to wait
for were bogged down, lost in the rows of sheds and warehouses that lined the
streets. The driving snow did not help,
covering “cast-off anchors and abandoned spars” for the men to trip over.[82]
While Morgan waited, Carleton sent reinforcements to the
Lower Town. Colonel Caldwell arrived
with a detachment of British militia at the second barricade and quickly
restored order, forming the regulars in a line behind the barrier and ordering
the militia to take up places in the houses surrounding. A detachment, led by a sailor named Captain
Anderson, came through the gate, calling on Morgan’s men to surrender. They responded by killing Anderson and
assaulting the barricade.[83] Morgan’s men would have no luck retaking the
barricade. No man was able to make it
over the top alive, rendering the ladders useless. Crossfire from the adjoining houses left the
men exposed to fire. When Morgan ordered
a retreat, no man would move, fearing to step outside of the shelter they found
amid the houses. They soon would have no
way to get out.
Carleton seized the initiative and sent Captain George Laws
with five hundred Royal Highland Emigrants and sailors to trap Morgan in
between the two barricades. Along the way, Laws encountered Captain Dearborn’s
New Englanders, who were late in joining the fight. The Americans had little chance to resist;
their gunpowder was soaked and they were heavily outnumbered. Dearborn surrendered his men after a brief
fight.[84]
Laws, in a hurry to catch Morgan and his men, was himself
taken prisoner at Sault au Matelot. This small victory was short-lived, however,
as Morgan and his men were unable to hold out much longer. They were out of gunpowder, with one in five
killed or wounded. They capitulated to
both Laws’ men and Colonel Caldwell’s troops, who opened the barricade door to
receive their prisoners.[85] The attempt to take Quebec had failed.
VII. Conclusion
The reasons for the American defeat at Quebec can be looked
at in two ways—immediate and overall. In
the immediate sense, the attack failed due to lack of cohesion and the loss of
leadership. Montgomery’s plan depended
on speed and coordination, both difficult to achieve in a dark, driving
snowstorm, over unknown, icy territory.
Montgomery’s assault fell apart when he was killed and his subordinates
were unable to operate on their own.
With Arnold wounded, his assault slowed, leading to indecision at the
second barricade. Without Montgomery and
Arnold, the men were left without dynamic leadership and ability. Their effectiveness crumbled.
The overall reasons are the condition of the men and their
supplies. Arnold’s men had a horrific
two-month march through wilderness, where they suffered under extremely adverse
conditions. Their supplies and equipment ruined they were never able to fully
recover, despite help from the habitants
and Montgomery.
Epilogue
Disoriented and freezing, we were much like Montgomery’s
men in 1775. The difference was we were
not armed invaders. Eventually we were
able to double-back and climb a staircase to the Upper Town, enjoying the
success the Americans did not. The Americans eventually withdrew in the spring
of 1776 after a failed siege, which was beleaguered by disease and lack of
supplies. Without proper guidance,
direction, and preparation, we had become lost in Quebec City just as the
Americans did in 1775.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Chase, Philander D. The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series vols.
1-3. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987.
Cohen, Sheldon S. “Lieutenant
John Starke and the Defence of Quebec.” Dalhousie
Review 47, Spring 1967: 57-64.
________, ed. Canada Preserved: The Journal of Captain Thomas Ainslie. New York:
New York University Press, 1968.
Henry, John Joseph. Account of Arnold’s Campaign Against Quebec. New York: Arno
Press, Inc., 1968.
Roberts, Kenneth, comp. March to Quebec: Journals of the Members of
Arnold’s
Expedition. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1953.
Roche, John F. “Quebec Under Siege, 1775-1776: The ‘Memorandums’ of Jacob
Danford” Canadian Historical Review 50: 68-85.
Würtele,
Frederick C., ed. Blockade of Quebec in
1775-1776 by the American
Revolutionists (Les Bastonnais.) Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1970.
Secondary Sources
Bird, Harrison. Attack on Quebec: The American Invasion of Canada, 1775. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968.
Chidsey,
Donald Barr. The War in the North: An
Informal History of the American
Revolution in and near Canada. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1967.
Culver, Henry B. and Gordon Grant. The
Book of Old Ships. New York: Doubleday,
Doran, & Co., 1924.
Hatch, Robert McConnell. Thrust for Canada: The American Attempt on
Quebec in
1775-1776. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979.
Lanctot, Gustave. Canada & the American Revolution 1775-1783. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967.
Nelson, Paul David. General Sir Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester:
Soldier-Statesman of
Early British Canada. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2000.
Shelton, Hal T. General Richard Montgomery and the American
Revolution: From
Redcoat to Rebel. New York: New York University Press, 1994.
Smith, Justin H. Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony:
Canada and the American
Revolution. 2 vols. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1907.
Stanley, George F.G. Canada Invaded 1775-1776. Toronto: A.M. Hakkert Ltd., 1973.
Whiteley,
W.H. “The British Navy and the Siege of Quebec, 1775-76.” Canadian
Historical Review 61: 3-27.
Wilson, Barry K. Benedict Arnold: A Traitor in Our Midst. Ithaca: McGill-Queens’
University Press, 2001.