Shifting
Sands:
Continuity
and Change in Russian-Saudi Relations
Christopher Diehl
Political Science
Of the many changes that Russian
foreign policy has undergone since the end of the Brezhnev era, the evolution
of Russia’s policy toward Saudi Arabia
is particularly striking. This change in foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia and the greater Arabian
Peninsula is a dramatic departure from the policies of exploiting
regional conflicts to gain political influence and military footholds that
characterized the Brezhnev era. What has changed in this relationship is not
merely the liquidation of Russian military presence in the region or the fact
that the Middle East is no longer a field of
competition for dueling superpowers. Instead, it is the essence of what
motivates Russian foreign policy that has been transformed. Russian foreign
policy toward Saudi Arabia
is now motivated by economic interests and to a lesser extent, national
security concerns. Saudi
Arabia is no longer the prized jewel to be
influenced in an ongoing campaign to diminish US standing in the region.
Instead, Russia views Saudi Arabia as
both an economic competitor and potential partner. Russia
also views Saudi Arabia
as a state whose religious influence must be harnessed to serve Russian
security imperatives, and as a state whose security concerns will have to be
taken into consideration when dealing with other states in the region.
To begin
exploring the changing nature of this relationship, this paper will trace
Soviet policies in the Middle East that impacted relations with Saudi Arabia
and the Saudi response to these policies.
Next, the role Mikhail Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” played in
precipitating far-reaching change in Russian foreign policy toward the Gulf
will be examined. Finally, this paper will survey the three key concerns that
currently drive Russian foreign policy toward Saudi
Arabia: oil and natural gas, arms and technology trade
with Iran and Israel and
Islamic extremism. Examining this change in Russian foreign policy and these
key areas of current interest will provide much insight into what motivates
Russian foreign policy in general and what the future of Russian-Saudi
relations may hold.
A Short History of
Russian-Saudi Relations to 1979
Modern Russian
interaction with Saudi Arabia
dates back to the 1920s, a time when much of the Middle
East was under British mandate. The landmass that later became
modern-day Saudi Arabia
was still divided amongst rival tribes. The Hejaz, home to Mecca, Medina, and
the port of Jeddah, was under control of the Hashemites, a favorite of the
British, whose members also ruled Transjordan and Iraq. When the Hejaz was
captured by the rival al-Saud, the USSR was delighted to immediately
recognize them as the area’s legitimate rulers. Unlike the Hashemites, the
al-Saud were not beholden to British support. Naturally, the Soviets saw this
as a prime opportunity to both curb British imperialism and make an ally of
their own in the region.
This would not be the last time the Soviet Union sought to influence Saudi Arabia
vis-à-vis another great power.
Relations
between Russia and Saudi Arabia
tapered off to an eventual end following a trade dispute in 1928 and
interaction between the two states would remain dormant until Nikita Khrushchev
came to power. The
Middle East soon became centrally important to expanding the USSR’s influence across the Third
World at the expense of its rivals, as US and British influence
and military presence in the region was already strong.
Therefore, good relations with Saudi
Arabia were an obvious objective of Soviet
foreign policy. Despite its high value as a potential client in the region,
Soviet actions overwhelmingly proved to alienate Saudi Arabia and would forestall
diplomatic relations for three and a half decades.
The first
instance in which the Soviet Union and Saudi
Arabia found themselves at odds was in North Yemen
following a Nasserist coup there in 1962. When Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s rival for
leadership of the Arab world, moved seventy-thousand troops into North Yemen to
bolster the republican forces that recently came to power, the Saudis responded
by lending material support to the deposed royalist forces in their bid to
regain power. When Egyptian troops were withdrawn from North Yemen in the wake
of Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, the USSR quickly moved to fill
the void, supplying MiG fighters, Ilyushin bombers, small arms, regular airlift
support and even pilots for the Yemen Arab Republic Air Force.
The Saudis were already wary of the Soviets because of their relationship with Egypt and this
move seemed to confirm their suspicions that the Soviets had larger designs on
the region. Both states soon found themselves engaging each other by-proxy once
again in The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South
Yemen). The Soviets provide substantial training to the new
Marxist government there and gained a military foothold in the process.
Technical and material support was nominal, but extensive access was given to
Soviet military schools. A party school was also established by the Soviets, complete
with Soviet instructors to teach Marxist-Leninist theory and party control
methods in an effort to ensure the Soviet (as opposed to Maoist) interpretation
of Marxism-Leninism became firmly entrenched within the PDRY government. In
addition, the USSR increased
its offshore naval presence, made use of the port of Aden
as a submarine base, and took control of former British airfields for
reconnaissance flights during its involvement there. In
response to the growing presence of the USSR
in its neighborhood, the Saudis proceeded to arm and support tribal factions
purged from the PDRY army in their bid to overthrow the Aden government. The Saudi-backed campaign
amounted to little more than a series of raids, with the movement having no
clear agenda or appeal to the general population. The movement steadily
declined, and after being fairly inactive in its aid, Riyadh formally ceased their support when it
normalized relations with the PDRY.
This same policy
of intervening in internal conflicts to support socialist-oriented regimes that
have come, or are fighting to come, to power continued to be employed by the
Soviet Union into the 1970s. The Saudis perceived this policy as one of steady
encirclement and were further alarmed by the growing relationship between the USSR and Iraq, which began with arms sales
and culminated in a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship in 1972. The Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia gave
support to opposing sides during the Marxist Dhofar rebellion in Oman and
continued to match each other’s support tit-for-tat in places like Ethiopia and
Somalia, with Saudi Arabia going so far in the case of the latter to advocate
US military and economic assistance. The Saudis also extended aid to
anti-Soviet forces outside of the greater Arabian Peninsula area, including Zaire and Angola.
Finally, the Saudis scored their biggest coup when Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat, with whom the Saudis had been cultivating a relationship, ordered the
withdrawal of Soviet advisors in 1972. In seizing upon the many opportunities
to gain influence and military footholds, the USSR
set itself back in achieving its foreign policy goal of developing relations
with Saudi Arabia.
The Policies of the Late
Brezhnev Era
After making the
Saudis wary and later hostile to its foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, the
Soviet Union opted to attempt to exploit
cracks in Saudi-American relations in order to get closer to the desert
kingdom. After the Saudis condemned the outcome of the US-sponsored Camp David
Accords and joined in expelling Egypt
from the Arab League, the Soviets wasted no time commencing a charm offensive
aimed at bringing the Saudis around to rapprochement. In
a January 1979 article entitled “Saudi Arabia: What Next?” Soviet
Middle East specialist Igor Belyayev asserted that Saudi fear and mistrust of
the USSR was largely created
and stoked by the US
media. Belyayev also argued that there were no serious impediments to renewed
Soviet-Saudi relations, even quoting a senior Saudi Prince as being amenable to
the possible reestablishment of diplomatic ties.
This appeal in
Soviet commentary for better relations continued in the subsequent months,
highlighting the fact that the USSR
and Saudi Arabia shared the
same position on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and accusing the US of fanning
Saudi fears in order to gain a military advantage of its own.
In regards to growing US arms exports to Saudi Arabia that included Airborne
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and F-15 fighter aircraft, one commentator
accused the US of “using Saudi money to build reserve bases in Saudi Arabia,
fully equipped and waiting to be used by American forces.” He argued that by
doing so the US
was “ignoring the will and aspirations of the true masters of this region – the
peoples who inhabit it.”
In effect, the Soviets were trying to cast the US as a meddlesome, destabilizing
force in the region in hopes of appearing more reasonable to the Saudis by
comparison. By touting its pro-Palestinian credentials, portraying the US in a negative light and consistently calling
for relations, the USSR
believed Saudi Arabia
would soon come around to restoring diplomatic ties.
It is difficult
to assess how well the strategy of exploiting cracks in the US-Saudi
relationship was working because amid this flurry of commentary came the
eruption of conflict in Afghanistan.
Faced with the prospect of an allied socialist nation on its border
disintegrating into factional rule and threatening a spillover effect on the
rest of the Central Asian Soviet republics, the USSR, in accordance with the
Brezhnev doctrine, decided to intervene. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan
on Christmas Eve 1979 to aid the unpopular Marxist government in regaining
control over a rebelling population that resented secular reforms. The
Soviets also saw the ensuing unrest as an element of the US’s “imperialist strategy,” with Afghanistan being a suitable place for the US to
reconstitute electronic listening posts that were lost when the Shah of Iran
was toppled.
From a Saudi and
American point of view, the invasion represented a Soviet thrust toward the
Persian Gulf area, putting Soviet forces several hundred miles closer than they
had been to the Arabian Peninsula and its oil
reserves. While a thrust toward the Gulf was not likely part of the Soviet
calculus, the invasion led President Jimmy Carter to comment on the situation
in his 1980 State of the Union address, stating that any hostile actions by the
Soviets in the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on the vital interests
of the US and that “such an assault would be repelled by any means necessary.”
The US soon
concluded that a forceful response was indeed necessary and the best option was
to arm the Afghan rebellion. The Saudis, who by now were convinced that Soviet foreign
policy was unquestionably aggressive and hostile to Muslim states, became a
natural and willing partner in this endeavor. The Saudis provided much of the
funding that was channeled through the Pakistani intelligence service to
furnish training and equipment for the resistance, matching the CIA’s
contributions dollar for dollar between 1981 and 1984. Saudi Arabia also provided some of the Arab
manpower that joined the resistance, enabling its citizens to visit and train
at mujahideen camps in Pakistan.
Once again, the USSR and Saudi Arabia were engaged in
indirect conflict with each other, and by the mid-1980s, relations between the
two were no better off than they were two decades earlier. Afghanistan was simply the latest in a string of
situations in which Soviet policies toward the Third World, specifically the
Middle East, conflicted with its own desire to have diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.
The policy of trying to gain influence wherever there was an opening by
befriending the current radical government or helping a new one come to power,
could not be reconciled with Saudi Arabia’s own need to feel secure amongst its
neighbors. Therefore, the strategy that was employed by the Soviets for twenty
years ultimately failed to advance their foreign policy objectives toward Saudi Arabia.
The Impact of New Thinking
In 1985, just as
Soviet efforts in Afghanistan
began to falter, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist
Party. His outlook on international relations and policies of New Thinking were
a significant departure from the foreign policy carried out during the Brezhnev
era. Gorbachev recognized that the nations of the world were becoming
increasingly interdependent. He believed that unbridled competition in terms of
weaponry and world influence served only to threaten international security and
that an enormous amount of energy and resources had already been diverted from
other priorities because of such competition.
In practical terms, this meant a shift in foreign policy was in the offing,
with influence and military presence in the Third World
becoming less important in the future. In the very beginning of the foreign
policy portion of his speech to the twenty-seventh congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Gorbachev stated that “the tasks of the
country’s economic and social development also determines the CPSU’s
international strategy.”
In other words, the most pressing issues of the day, such as economic reform,
would have an increased bearing on Soviet foreign policymaking. Among other
things, this new outlook had implications for Afghanistan. In his speech
Gorbachev went on to refer to Afghanistan
as a “bleeding wound,” and while the USSR “supports the country’s
efforts aimed at defending it sovereignty,” extricating itself from this
conflict and bringing its troops home would be high on the Soviet foreign
policy agenda.
Gorbachev also
explicitly stated that the Soviet Union was “in favor of stepping up collective
searches for ways of defusing conflict situations in the Middle
East.”
The Soviet Union did just that when it cosponsored a UN resolution with the US calling for a cease-fire in the war between Iran and Iraq.
It was clear that Gorbachev was interested in curbing geo-strategic competition
with the US in order to
build trust and cooperation, as well as to allow the Soviet
Union to focus more of its attention and resources on internal
demands. Once the USSR
completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Soviet and Saudi officials began to seriously discuss normalizing relations.
Shortly after
these developments came the ultimate test of New Thinking’s practicality: the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
There was a great deal of internal debate in the Kremlin concerning what
position the USSR
should take on this crisis. The Soviet Union
was faced with a choice of either following through on Gorbachev’s vision of
building a strong, cooperative relationship with the West and entering an
interdependent world free of zero-sum competition, or drifting back to the more
conservative policies of maintaining regional influence.
It is important to consider what the USSR
had to lose by joining the international coalition in condemning Iraq. By its
own estimates, the USSR
stood to lose approximately $800 million in trade and payments, mostly from
tripartite oil deals and arms sales as well as an additional $5-20 billion in
lost debt repayment.
In addition to these economic disincentives, the USSR would have to live with what
conservatives in the Kremlin considered to be a blow to its own prestige if it
were to ignore its own interests and condone a US led intervention.
Reluctant to
abandon its long-time trading partner but also committed to remaining on the
right side of world opinion, the Soviets opted for a middle-of-the-road
approach. As the crisis wore on, Soviet diplomats laboriously tried to convince
Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait
in order to save the USSR’s
trade relationship with Iraq,
or at least ensure that it remained in salvageable condition after hostilities
ceased.
More importantly, however, the USSR
never withdrew its support of the US-led coalition and enjoyed a worthwhile pay
off as a result. In addition to upholding some of the principles of New
Thinking and improving its standing with the West, the USSR was
rewarded with what it had been seeking for decades. In September 1990,
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia
were restored and the Saudis offered a $1.5 billion aid package to the USSR. The Soviet Union was also delighted by the prospect of Saudi
investment in their economy and arms deals with the kingdom. This episode would
help set the course for future Russian foreign policy. From this point on,
relations would primarily be conducted in pursuit of tangible rewards, not
military or geopolitical superiority vis-à-vis the US.
A Look to the Present
In the years that have followed since the end of the
Cold War, Russia’s
priorities have shifted from trying match US military and political strength,
to reforming and growing its economy and coming to grips with ethnic and
religious strife. Despite this seemingly more inward-looking priority shift,
relations and interaction with Saudi
Arabia still figure prominently into the
post-Soviet national agenda. Russia
and Saudi Arabia must still
deal with each other on three key issues that are central to Russia’s
economic growth and the easing of ethno-religious troubles. First, Russia and Saudi Arabia find themselves as
competitors and potential partners in the world energy market. Second, Saudi Arabia
has objections and concerns about Russia’s
commercial dealings and growing relationships with Iran
and Israel.
Finally, Moscow’s relationship with Riyadh is an important
part of quelling Islamist extremism within its borders and integrating its Muslim
minority in order to prevent future religiously-charged political violence. In
short, Russia’s relationship
with Saudi Arabia,
in both competitive and cooperative aspects, is one determined by economic
interests and national security concerns, not the desire for strategic
influence that characterized its foreign policy in the past.
Energy: Competition and
Cooperation
With
economic growth ranking high on the national and foreign policy agenda, the
success and profit of Russia’s
oil and natural gas industry is of utmost importance to the Russian economy, as
well as the health of the government’s treasury. Saudi
Arabia and Russia are the number one and
number two oil producers in the world respectively, but despite sharing this
distinction, both have very different pricing policies, bringing both states
into direct competition. This competition is virtually non-existent in the
natural gas sector, and the many incentives for cooperation in this area could
form the basis for better relations and policy coordination on other issues.
Oil
The 1990s were a
troubling time for the Russian oil industry with production declining to 6.1
million barrels per day (b/d) in 1996, down 5.4 million b/d from 1987 levels.
However, a turnaround began in 1999 as world oil prices began to rise.
Production is now booming and Russia’s
output is second only to Saudi
Arabia. With prices high and output growing
at a rate of 800,000 b/d annually, Russia is growing increasingly
accustomed to and even dependant on the large revenue that comes with such a
boom.
Therefore, oil interests are no doubt a top consideration for Russia in
formulating its foreign policy.
Before
going any further, it is important to understand Russia’s
position in the world oil market relative to Saudi Arabia. Russia holds 6.2 percent of the world’s proven
oil reserves, compared to Saudi
Arabia’s 22 percent.
Unlike Saudi Arabia,
geography is a limiting factor for Russia’s oil industry. Much of Russia’s
unexploited reserves lie in artic and far eastern areas and the location and
extreme climes of these reserves present additional challenges and costs to
their development. Russia
also lacks the robust pipeline infrastructure and deep water terminals that are
required to accommodate the large tankers that can carry oil across the
Atlantic to the US. A pipeline to the Pacific, intended to serve
tankers bound for Japan, South Korea and the US, is currently under construction
and is expected to be completed in 2008, however.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia has easy access to its unexploited
reserves, a well developed pipeline system and access to deep water terminals
on both the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Another
key difference between the Saudi and Russian industries is state control. Saudi
ARAMCO is state owned and the kingdom is a member of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and as such it is capable and willing to
increase or decrease production as needed to control prices. While there is
growing concern over increased state control, particularly due to the growing
strength of the state-controlled firms Gazprom and Rosneft, approximately 70
percent of Russia’s
oil industry remains privatized, making the regulation of production more
difficult to coordinate.
The
fundamental difference in the oil policies of Russia
and Saudi Arabia
stems from each state’s unique position in the world oil market. As a country
with a large population and small reserves relative to other top producers, Russia favors a
strategy of short-term revenue maximization. Saudi Arabia, a country with much
larger reserves, low production costs, a small population and low domestic
consumption, favors a strategy of long-term revenue maximization.
It is in Saudi Arabia’s
interest to extend the life of its oil economy as long as possible because it
has the reserves to do so and because its economy is less diversified than an
economy like Russia’s.
Russia,
on the other hand, does not have the infrastructure or cheaply exploitable
reserves that are suited for long term maximization and instead seeks to make
the most of current boom times. These differing strategies bring Russia and Saudi Arabia into direct
competition and disagreement with each other on world oil pricing policy.
Saudi Arabia’s policy is to keep prices at a
moderate level that is acceptable to world consumers, especially the United States.
While Saudi Arabia
certainly wants prices that will generate healthy revenue, it is sensitive to
prices becoming too high. If prices were to remain too high for an extended
period of time, this could prompt a dedicated effort by consumers to develop
and implement the use of alternative fuels and conservation. If and when oil
alternatives such as fuel cells or hydrogen became inexpensive and commonplace,
Saudi oil fields would be significantly devalued and the incentive for the US to ensure security in the Persian
Gulf would be greatly reduced.
The obsolescence of oil is certainly in the distant future, but Saudi Arabia is
intent on slowing the emergence of a truly competitive alternative fuel
industry. In order to influence world oil prices, Saudi Arabia keeps a portion of its
production capacity idle so that it can pump more oil in times of shortage or
crisis and thus keep prices stable.
Russia and Saudi Arabia first came into
conflict over oil prices in late 2001. Unrestrained production by non-members,
including Russia,
led OPEC to call on all producers to coordinate a curb on production to prevent
a price collapse. OPEC planned to cut production by 1.5 million b/d and
requested that non-members collectively pledge a 500,000 b/d cut, with Russia cutting
150,000 b/d of that sum. The Russian government balked at this, agreeing to
only cut 30,000 b/d, not yet ready to let go of the windfall revenue that came
from its increased production over the past two years. Russian officials cited
two reasons for not wanting to join in the production cut. First, Russia did not
want to lose any additional revenue, as it already stood to lose some in the
coming months as Siberian operations began to slow down for winter. Second, Russia wanted to regain market share lost after
the disintegration of the USSR.
However, as the threat of a price collapse continued to loom, Russia finally
agreed to the originally requested cuts.
Russia and Saudi
Arabia also collided on oil pricing during the run up to
the American invasion of Iraq
in early 2003. Saudi Arabia
pledged to raise production by as much as 2.5 million b/d to make up for any
supply shortages that might occur as a result of hostilities. This elicited a
harsh response from Russia,
in which deputy prime minister, Viktor Khristenko warned that if OPEC “played
politics” with the war in Iraq,
“it would be the beginning of the end of the organization.”
The roles were now reversed, with Russia fearing that a price
collapse could result from OPEC’s rapid expansion of production.
In
September 2003, then-Crown Prince Abdullah visited Moscow
to ease tensions over pricing and to begin a dialogue on developing a mechanism
by which Russia and Saudi Arabia
could coordinate their pricing policies toward mutually beneficial ends.
It is important to note, however, that Saudi
Arabia does have some leverage over Russia. Saudi Arabia
has confronted the problem of “quota busters” before, and its position in the world
oil market gives it the ability to punish those who are uncooperative. It can
use its excess capacity to drive prices down to a level that would make
production unprofitable for Russian firms. Saudi Arabia’s low production costs
allow it to still turn a handsome profit at $10/barrel while Russian production
becomes unprofitable at $12/barrel.
It is unlikely that Russia
will provoke such actions given the fact that every $1/barrel decline in prices
cuts around $1 billion from its federal budget revenue.
With both states being dependent on their oil wealth to varying degrees, there
is a shared interest in maintaining a mutually satisfactory price range and
cooperation on the issue is likely. Of course, during periods of record demand
that force both Russia and Saudi Arabia to produce at full capacity, pricing
policy becomes less contentious an issue.
Natural Gas
Another
area in which Russia and Saudi Arabia
share similar economic interests and cooperative potential is the natural gas
industry. Russia
is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, possessing an estimated 1688.0
trillion cubic feet of the resource, or 26.6 percent of the world’s total
proven reserves.
Unfortunately, much like its oil reserves, most of Russia’s
untapped reserves are found in some of its more hostile environments such as
Siberia and the Artic
Ocean. The costs
associated with developing these distant and difficultly situated fields are
daunting, mainly due to the transportation infrastructure that would need to be
further developed to be able to deliver gas to consumers.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia
has not placed as much emphasis on developing its smaller natural gas deposits
until recently. Through the 1990s, the kingdom has become more reliant on
natural gas for its power generation, petrochemical manufacturing and water
desalination needs and has expressed a desire for more investment in its
natural gas industry.
It is widely believed that Saudi Arabia has considerable gas reserves that have
yet to be fully exploited and is therefore is becoming increasingly attractive
to non-Saudi firms in the business of exploration and development.
This
opening presents a prime opportunity for Russia to advance economic
interests and build the foundation for cooperation on other issues.
This is also an opportunity for both states to finally realize the vibrant
trade and investment relationship that was supposed to materialize after the USSR supported US
intervention and sanctions against Iraq in 1991. Gazprom, for example,
has considerable experience in natural gas exploration and development and
would benefit greatly from the opportunity to develop the much more accessible
Saudi gas deposits.
This is already
beginning to happen. After “core venture” agreements with several Western energy
firms fell through in 2003, Saudi
Arabia, still intent on attracting
investment in its gas reserves, signed exploration and development deals with
several international firms. One of these firms was LUKoil, Russia’s
largest privately owned energy firm.
Saudi ARAMCO also conferred official contractor status on Stroitransgaz in 2003
so it could participate in future oil and gas projects.
Cooperation on energy policy between Russia
and Saudi Arabia
may only be in its infant stages, but it is clear there is great potential in
the natural gas sector for both states to prosper through joint efforts.
Israel
Since the end
of the Cold War, Russian relations with Israel
have warmed significantly in many respects, much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia.
Up until this point, policy toward Israel was one of few similarities
shared by both states. Cooperation to advance their common position on settling
the Arab-Israeli conflict was traditionally seen as a potential point of
departure for improving relations between Russia
and Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, Russia has
cultivated a close relationship predicated on strong mutual economic, cultural
and counterterrorism interests with Israel. It is unlikely Moscow will forego these
new ties simply to maintain its pro-Palestinian credentials in the Arab world.
Relations began to thaw
in 1991 when diplomatic relations with Israel
resumed and immigration restrictions that prevented refuseniks from moving to Israel were lifted.
Over the course of the 1990s, an estimated one million Russian Jews immigrated
to Israel,
and now make up twenty percent of the population and are a powerful political,
cultural and economic force in the country.
In particular, they are a much sought after bloc of swing voters in
Israeli elections.
The growing cultural interconnectedness between both states is significant;
Russian Jews in Israel
seem adamant to retain their Russian identity as Russian language daily
newspapers and Russian TV beamed via satellite are immensely popular among
these communities.
While retaining their own distinct culture, Russian Jews are still making
strides integrating themselves into Israeli society by embracing civic
obligations. It is interesting to note that the proportion of Russian Jews
serving in combat units in the Israeli Army is greater than their proportion of
the general population, and their patriotism and commitment to the state have
not gone unnoticed by older Israelis.
This greater proportion is due in part to a dearth of Orthodox Jews eligible
for military service exemptions in the Russian-born segment of the Israeli
population, but it is noteworthy nonetheless. In essence, the world’s largest
Russian diaspora, still connected to their homeland, will play an increasing
role in Israeli politics and this could eventually have some bearing on Russian
attitudes and policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Cultural and linguistic
ties are only one dimension of improved Russian-Israeli relations. In
tune with the theme of advancing economic interests that has become central to
Russian foreign policy, Russia
is also forming a substantial trade relationship with Israel, which
has grown to be worth more than $1 billion annually.
In addition, this trade relationship has given way to joint defense-industry
projects. Russia and Israel have
already completed development of the Kamov 50-2 attack helicopter, combining a
Russian airframe with Israeli avionics.
Russia has also made its
spacelift capability available to Israel, recently launching the
Eros-B imagery satellite for Tel Aviv.
Joint defense industry ventures like these will not only open new markets to
Russian arms and expertise, they also give Russia greater access to
sophisticated technology.
Finally, Russia and Israel have come to identify with
each other as they both continue to face Islamic extremism and terrorist
attacks on civilians. Russian and Israeli officials have declared their
solidarity in the fight against terror numerous times and have been
conspicuously guarded in their commentary of each others counterterrorism
policies. Besides sympathizing with each other, there is potential for actual
cooperation on issues of counterterrorism. Following the Beslan school attack,
Israeli officials offered to help Russia in its struggle during a
visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Israel has dealt with
terrorism far longer than Russia
and is viewed by many as a counterterrorism laboratory from which the rest of
the world can learn. If cooperation on counterterrorism training and
intelligence sharing occurs, the bonds that have formed between Russia and Israel will only become stronger.
There are, however, many
contentious issues in Russian-Israeli relations that have yet to be resolved;
Iranian nuclear development, arms sales to Iran and Syria, and an invitation to
Moscow for Hamas officials following their 2006 election victory are just a few
areas in which Russia and Israel have serious disagreements. Nevertheless, the
relationship between Moscow and Tel Aviv has
grown closer in recent years, and Riyadh
is not happy. Russia’s
pro-Palestinian tendencies could fade if a strong relationship with Israel should emerge, dashing the Saudis’ hopes
that Russia
would continue to look out for Palestinian interests by pushing for a return to
the peace process.
Iran
Russian
relations with Iran are also
problematic to Saudi Arabia.
While Saudi-Iranian relations have improved significantly in recent years,
there was a time when Iran
was quite hostile toward the Saudis, criticizing their relationship with the US, their
backing of Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, and the treatment of their
Shi’a minority. This former animosity could be reignited, with growing concern
that Saudi Arabia and Iran could find themselves backing opposing
sides of an Iraqi civil war, following an eventual US withdrawal. Iran’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs are also unsettling to the Saudis. Tehran’s push to develop fissile material, in conjunction
with a long range missile capability, could eventually give Iran the capability
to launch a nuclear strike on its neighbors and lead to the adoption of a more
coercive foreign policy.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Riyadh
does not look favorably on Moscow’s support to Iran’s nuclear
and missile development programs and conventional forces.
Iran has been a lucrative market for Russia to
unload military equipment and technical know-how in return for hard currency. Russia has sold three Kilo-class submarines to Iran and in 2000, President Vladimir Putin
decided to walk away from the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement so Russia could enter into a licensing agreement
that would allow Iran
to assemble MiG-29 fighter aircraft and T-72C tanks. Iran has also
benefited from the availability of exportable Russian air defense systems, most
recently purchasing Tor M-1 tactical surface-to-air missile systems in late
2006. It is also widely believed that Iran has benefited from Russian
expertise in the development and enhancement of its Shehab-3 medium range
missile, which could one day serve as a nuclear delivery platform.
The
most important and most profitable Russian contribution to Iranian military
capability is nuclear cooperation. In 1995, Russia signed on to complete the
Bushehr nuclear reactor left unfinished by the German firm Siemens shortly
after the Islamic Revolution. The chance to complete the abandoned reactor was
a prime opportunity to advance Russian economic interests in the Middle East. It was believed by Russian officials that
work on Bushehr would bring positive publicity to the Russian nuclear industry
and lead to other deals in the region.
The Bushehr deal itself was estimated to have been worth between $800 million
and $1 billion, with eighty percent of the contract reportedly being paid in
cash, undoubtedly giving a much needed shot in the arm to the Russian nuclear
industry. Russia also stands to gain from enriching
uranium for Iran, should Tehran choose to forego
its fledgling indigenous enrichment capability.
Despite the
destabilizing effects Iranian nuclear and missile advancements could have on
the region and the objections of the US, EU and others, Russian technical
support to Iran has been very profitable and is illustrative of Russia’s policy
of pursuing economic interests first and foremost. While cooperation with Iran is not necessarily grounds for severing
relations with Russia and
foregoing some of the emerging benefits, Saudi Arabia will certainly remain
wary.
Chechnya, Terrorism, and
Islam
The last major foreign policy
issue facing Russia relative
to Saudi Arabia is the
secessionist movement in Chechnya,
the terrorism campaign conducted in its name, and the potential spread of
radical Islam among Russia’s
Muslim population and the neighboring states of Central
Asia. While economic considerations involving energy pipelines do
factor into the Chechnya
problem, this is largely an issue of national security. Russian officials,
including Vladimir Putin, believed that failure to suppress the Chechen
insurgency could ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation.
Therefore ensuring Chechnya
stays pacified remains high on the government’s agenda. Moscow and Riyadh
have long been at odds concerning the spread of conservative Islam. Hard
feelings surrounding this issue date back to the war in Afghanistan and were reignited when Saudi Arabia
recognized and provided economic assistance to the Taliban. This renewed
Islamist influence in Central Asia led Moscow to grant support in the form of
ammunition, uniforms, fuel, helicopters, intelligence, and air support to Ahmed
Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance long before 9/11.
Although
the Taliban has since been removed from power and Afghanistan is slowly being secured
and rebuilt under international stewardship, the issue of Islamic extremism is
still very much on the minds of Russian policymakers. Radical Islam appears to
be overshadowing separatism as the cause fueling violence in Chechnya and it
threatens to divide Chechen society itself and usher in more instability. Russia charges that Saudi
Arabia is to blame for this rise in extremism, by not
only using its wealth to spread Wahhabi teachings, but to fund actual terrorist
operations in Chechnya
and neighboring republics. In Dagestan, for
example, officials claimed that at one point, up to three thousand
Saudi-funded, Wahhabi fighters were operating there.
It is also worth noting that several former key operatives in Chechnya,
including the notorious Khattab and Sheikh Abu Omar al-Saif, hailed from the
desert kingdom. It has also been widely circulated that the Chechen rebels who
seized a Russian theater in 2002 had placed several telephone calls to Saudi
sponsors during the standoff.
In
addition to alleged operational aid, both sides remain at odds over the nature
of Saudi humanitarian assistance to Chechnya. Russia asserts
that this aid is being used to build schools and mosques that espouse a radical
interpretation of Islam. The Saudis acknowledge they do not have absolute
control over where the donations of their independently wealthy citizens
ultimately end up, but they insist that Islamic foundations based and
registered in the kingdom do not engage in funding the spread of radical
ideology or terrorist activities and that their aims are charitable. Russia is also suspicious of Saudi Arabia’s
resistance to allow Russian NGOs and government agencies to distribute the aid
collected by Saudi charities. Saudi
Arabia contends that much of the aid does
not meet the intended recipients when distributed by Russian authorities. As a
result, Chechen authorities in charge of reconstruction have sought direct
links with Riyadh.
Because Saudi Arabia has some influence and standing
among Russia’s estimated 20
million Muslims, due to both its largesse and status as the guardian of Islam’s
holiest sites, Russia
has sought to use its relations with the kingdom as a means to improve its own
standing. In addition to its observer status in the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia
on dispensing humanitarian aid could significantly boost the Russian
government’s image among its Muslim population and give it better leverage in
dealing with extremism in Chechnya.
Riyadh’s
official position on this subject remains to be seen, however. The royal
family’s legitimacy and survival is largely dependent on its image as a
defender of Islamic causes. Cooperation on aid distribution could create the
perception of Saudi support for Russia’s
operations in Chechnya,
which would be met with disapproval in much of the Muslim world.
Nevertheless, Russia will
continue to seek cooperation from the Saudis on this subject as it is viewed as
being critical to the security and stability of Russia itself.
Conclusion
Russian
foreign policy has changed considerably in the several decades that have passed
since the late Brezhnev era. Gone is the overarching goal of securing influence
and military ties in order to eclipse US
influence in strategic areas such as the Persian Gulf.
As a result of this change, relations with countries that were once threatened
by Soviet-era policies are now approached by Russia with tangible interests in
mind. Relations with Saudi
Arabia, both good and bad, are quite
illustrative of this. Oil pricing policy is a potential area of competition;
however the incentive for coordination in order to achieve mutual benefits is
high. Russia
will likely continue to make the advancement of economic interests the
centerpiece of its foreign policy and opportunities like the development of
Saudi gas resources will undoubtedly be pursued. In addition, Russia is also
compelled to pursue economic interests that the Saudis do not approve of if the
rewards are great enough. Iran
represents a lucrative market for readily exportable conventional arms and
technical knowledge and Israel
also offers promising rewards, including access to advanced technology, trade
and counterterrorism cooperation. Finally, as Russia
continues to combat Islamist terrorism within its borders, it will likely seek
to enlist the Saudis’ help, fully aware of Riyadh’s
stature in the Muslim world and its usefulness in solving the Chechnya
problem. Simply put, Moscow
is no longer primarily interested in winning allies and holding sway; it is
interested in winning contracts, growing its economy and staying secure.