Jimmy Carter’s Human Rights Policy and Iran: a Re-examination, 1976-79

J= immy Carter’s Human Rights Policy and Iran: A Re-examination, 1976-79=

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J= ohn Gilbert

History

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In the late 1970s, the Iran= ian Revolution and the Iranian hostage crisis replaced America’s ally, the Shah, with an Islamic Republic that, to the present day, poses a threat to American interests in the Middle East.&nbs= p; The two aforementioned events left searing images in the minds of Americans and signaled the beginning of America’s global struggle against Islamic extremists. The individual who is often blamed= for this “loss” of Iran is former president Jimmy Carter. Because the crises in Iran occurred while Carter was in office, many critics have come to the conclusion that Carter was a “weak and indecisive” president.[1] By examining outcomes alone, they appeared to be correct. Altho= ugh Carter publicly professed the desire to change America’s role in international relations, his foreign policy was not particularly distinctive from his Cold War predecessors in practice, and many critics believe that h= is unwavering commitment to the Shah helped bring upon the revolution. However, outcomes alone do not tel= l the whole story. As president, Ca= rter was not blindly idealistic or loyal to the Shah or to the Iranian governmen= t, and his policies were not solely responsible for “losing” Iran. In order to pass judgme= nts on the quality of Carter’s foreign policy, historians and critics must f= irst carefully research the origins of individual policies in order to determine= why Carter chose the particular courses of action that he did, and what other alternatives might have been available.

A foreign policy initiative= of Carter’s that has especially been misunderstood was his global human rights policy. Like much of t= he administration’s foreign policy, its intentions were to set a new moralistic course in international relations and to move America away from outdated Cold War ideologies.[2] However, Carter’s inconsiste= nt implementation of the policy has led most historians to disregard its importance. Because Carter ap= peared to defer to the foreign policies of previous Cold War presidents, the issue= s of human rights and an American foreign policy infused with morals appeared to= be little more than shrewd political rhetoric. In terms of Iran, and like most ot= her Cold War foreign policy makers, Carter was reluctant to pursue a drastic new course. For many years, the S= hah had been effective at providing a certain level of stability to the Middle East, and Carter did not want to be remembered as the president who upset t= his delicate balance.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Consequently, the issue of human rights would become the wildcard of Carter’s term in office. The new and strikingly liberal pol= icy would embolden Iran’s intellectual opposition and raised the world= 217;s hope in American humanitarianism, but it would also place Carter in a vulnerable political position. As biographer Robert Strong writes, “Carter tried to deal with human rig= hts in a serious fashion without ignoring other foreign policy goals.”[3] This gave the appearance that Cart= er was trying to have it all ways, and in the process he would satisfy no one.

This essay will demonstrate what effects Carter’s human rights policy had on the Iranian Revoluti= on and Carter’s presidency. In particular, my analysis will focus on the first two years of Carter’s= term, when human rights were especially a priority in his foreign policy and when Iran’s various opposition movements experienced resurgences. Before examining Carter’s hu= man rights policy in relation to Iran, I will first examine the ideological constructions of the policy to determine Carter’s motives for advocat= ing human rights and why Carter placed it so high on his foreign policy agenda. Following this, and t= hrough the use of declassified government documents, the Carter administrationR= 17;s inconsistencies will be explored in order to determine how the application = of the administration’s human rights policy affected internal events in Iran. Particular focus will be given to the Iranian opposition movements and how Carter’s promise of human rights affected the nature of their protests. This essay does not absolve Carter= or his policies from responsibility, like many of his biographers have done. Nor does it contend that Carter was solely to blame for the unfavorable events that occurred in Iran, like many= of his sharpest critics have claimed. What this essay argues is that during the first half of Carter’= ;s presidency, the policy of human rights gave his administration an opportuni= ty to change America’s relations with Iran and to cut ties with the Shah= . More than anything, this essay may = be viewed as a case study of how the Carter administration’s human rights policy was applied in countries and regions where great American interests = were at stake. From this point, it= can be determined how the Carter administration formulated and practiced its foreign policy in Iran, the reasons Carter chose to maintain his support for the Shah, how Carter’s support of the Shah affected Iran’s inte= rnal struggles, and how the policy of human rights continues to obscure his lega= cy as a foreign policy maker.

The idea of a foreign policy framed around human rights publicly emerged first in 1976 as part of the Democratic Party’s election platform.[4] It was conceived by Carter and oth= er Democrats as a way for America to return to its “fundamental liberal principles that all too often had been ignored or even ridiculed by cold war foreign policy professionals.”[5] According to Carter, American fore= ign policy had been promoting repression instead of progress.[6] A year before the election, Carter= had expressed concern in his autobiography, titled Why Not the Best, that the U.S. had fallen away from morality in its foreign policy.[7] In Carter’s eyes, recent for= eign policy makers, notably Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, had promoted a po= licy that defended American interests at the price of disregarding morality and America’s duty to uphold a high standard in the world.[8] This doctrine of “realpolitik” was first implemented in the U.S. by America̵= 7;s original “Cold Warriors,” such as George Kennan, and had been applied by many American leaders throughout the Cold War.[9] It stated that the U.S. must set a= side its moralistic policies and instead pursue a careful, pragmatic, and realis= tic foreign policy. A foreign pol= icy crafted around morals and idealism, according to the doctrine, only agitated nationalism and communism in the third world, and would lead to more violen= ce and upheaval, thus compromising American interests abroad.[10] However, Carter believed it was unnecessary for American foreign policy makers to choose between morality a= nd interests; both could be achieved if the overall moral standard in the world was raised. Carter believed i= t was the duty of American leaders to construct a foreign policy “rooted in= our values” that could properly “serve mankind”.[11] In addition, Carter and the Democr= ats believed America’s realpolitik was playing directly into the hands of= the Soviet Union. According to th= is thinking, the U.S. was in no position to call attention to the “deplorable repression” sponsored by the Soviets, since the U.S. itself was supporting authoritarian dictators for the sake of its interests= .[12] To Carter, the lack of morality in foreign policy exemplified a broader trend of amoral American policy that culminated in the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation.[13] By reinstituting morality at home = and abroad through the promotion of global human rights, Carter believed he cou= ld restore the standing of America’s political institutions, both in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of the American people.=

Politically, Carter’s human rights policy was perceived as being a “no lose issue”.[14] According to Carter’s speech writer during the 1976 campaign, “liberals liked human rights because= it involved political freedom” and an end to America’s support of dictatorships, while “conservatives liked it because it involved criticisms of Russia.”[15] In addition, even though the Ameri= can public may have disapproved of the tactics employed by Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, they did not widely disapprove of the results.[16] Carter rightly sensed that the pub= lic did not want to sail too far off the foreign policy course set by the Republicans. However, promoti= ng continuity would not win Carter an election.[17] By advocating for human rights, Ca= rter could set himself apart from the Republicans without appearing to be too radical. Beyond bipartisanism, human rights were perceived as the glue that could hold the Democratic Party together, which had been bitterly divided in the previous two election loss= es.[18] In the mid-1970s, the general public continued to hold Democrats responsible for the escalation of the Vietnam War under President Lyndon Johnson.[19] Therefore, the promotion of global= human rights and policies that distanced the Democrats from the Cold War era could help them escape their damaging legacy of the 1960s.

However, the motives behind Carter’s desire to restore morality and promote global human rights w= ent much deeper than politics. His personal experiences as a southerner growing up in Georgia influenced his future decisions as a foreign policy maker.[20] Carter’s Christian backgroun= d and his mother’s atypical beliefs heavily affected the mindset of the bud= ding politician. Young Jimmy had b= een an anomaly in the American segregated south because he spent a considerable am= ount of time interacting with African Americans as a child.[21] In addition, his mother had partic= ipated in the Peace Corps in India and believed very strongly in desegregation.[22] These experiences and ingrained be= liefs would profoundly affect Carter’s mindset towards race relations and h= uman rights for all people. When C= arter served as a member of a local school board as a young man, he refused to jo= in the White Citizens’ Council that strongly opposed integration in publ= ic schools.[23] Although he did not always publici= ze his beliefs for fear of political backlash, Carter’s human rights policy = was derived from an upbringing in which he witnessed the dilemmas of an unequal society first hand. As presid= ent, Carter would draw upon these experiences as he attempted to bring human rig= hts and equality to the political limelight.

Carter entered the Oval Off= ice in January of 1977 believing that the Cold War had neared its conclusion, a= nd that the traditional fight against the Soviet Union and communism had become outdated.[24] In recent years, Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, no matter how morally bankrupt, had broug= ht about a détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the Cold = War seemed to be burning itself out. As historian H.W. Brands remarks, Carter “strove manfully to refashion t= he national interest to suit the new post-Cold War era.”[25] New methods and ideologies had to = be implemented in order for America to restore its standing in the world and m= ake amends for its ill-conceived war in Vietnam. As Carter stated, an “inordi= nate fear of communism” drove American foreign policy makers to “fig= ht fire with fire” in areas of the world that otherwise were unimportant= to the U.S. The “tragic experience of Vietnam”, according to Carter, had shown Americans that “fire is better quenched with water”.[26] Although it would soon be proven t= hat the Cold War was far from being over, a “soft” foreign policy promoting human rights initially appeared to be the solution for the new gl= obal picture that Carter envisioned.

In his inaugural address, Carter stressed that America’s “commitment to human rights must= be absolute.”[27] In the early weeks and months of 1= 977, Carter, along with several key members of his administration, set out to articulate what exactly he meant by “human rights”.[28] Although there were other key elem= ents to Carter’s foreign policy—such as scaling back armaments and nuclear weapons, improving relations with America’s allies, and assis= ting developing nations—human rights, at least publicly, was the administration’s top priority.[29] In a speech delivered by the new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in April 1977, Vance explained that all persons of the world possessed the “right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person.”[30] This meant that America must treat harshly those governments who sponsored “torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.= 221; In addition, Vance stated that “civil and political liberties” must be upheld, and that “vital needs,” such as “food, shelter, health care, and education,” must be ensured for all citizens. It appeared as though the Carter administration would grant no exceptions to human rights violators. In terms of the Shah of Iran, the administration privately expressed concern in classified correspondence that their traditional ally was exercising “unsatisfactory” human ri= ghts practices.[31] Although not known at the time, th= e way in which Carter chose to address these practices in Iran would turn out to = be the major foreign policy issue of his presidency.

In order to enforce the hum= an rights policy, the Carter administration realized that clear consequences h= ad to be established for violating nations.&n= bsp; The leverage for this was American humanitarian aid and financial assistance. To ensure that na= tions were in compliance with the human rights standards set by the administratio= n, as well those of the UN and Amnesty International, the Carter administration dangled the carrot of the American dollar.[32] As Carter stated early in his presidency:

In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance program, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to development. Towards regimes which persist in wholesale violations of human rights we will not hesitate to convey our outrage nor will we pretend that our relations are unaffected.[33]

Many of the regimes in question, including the Shah’s government in Iran, relied on American financial and military support for survival. By stating that human rights viola= tors would no longer be American aid recipients, the Carter administration was hoping to force nations into compliance.&n= bsp; The nations that did comply were supposed to receive considerable amounts of humanitarian and economic assistance. Since many of the nations in quest= ion were poor and politically unorganized, they were also extremely dependent on American assistance. Carter believed that not receiving American aid was a choice most countries would = not dare to make.

However, some nations would challenge Carter’s resolve. The policy’s greatest test would come in countries where the U= .S. possessed historic mutual interest-based relationships. The clearest example of this in the 1970s was Iran. For years, Am= erican leaders had maintained a delicate relationship with Iran’s government under the Shah. In 1953 the C= IA covertly participated in a coup in which “the pluralistic regime of P= rime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq” was overthrown and replaced with the Shah= .[34] The Shah, or Mohammad Reza Pahlavi= , was descended from a family dynasty that had long claimed authority as the hist= oric rulers of Iran.[35] The close relationship the Pahlavi dynasty shared with Great Britain and the United States encouraged the CIA = to reinstall the Shah to power. = The fear of Soviet expansionism, combined with Iran’s geographic position= on the Soviet Union’s southern border, aroused enough fears in Washingto= n to plot a replacement to Mosaddeq’s government. Also, the “loss” of Ch= ina in 1949 and the war in Korea beginning in 1950 heightened concerns that other nations in Asia and the Middle East would quickly succumb to communism.[36] Additionally, an unfriendly Irania= n government could have devastating consequences for Western economies heavily reliant on imported Iranian oil.[37] The end result of the coup was a p= uppet regime in Iran, and the Shah legitimized his government through authoritarianism and repression.[38] A mutual alliance was established = in which the U.S. and Iran defended one another’s interests. The U.S., through the Shah, could contain communism and ensure access to Iran’s oil, and the Shah could maintain authority and power in Iran through U.S. military aid and technical assistance. In 1955 the Shah = even signed his country into the Baghdad Pact, which stated that its purpose was “the containment of the Soviet Union” in the region’s affairs.[39]

As much as the Shah was favorable to the interests of the U.S., he was equally as detrimental towar= ds the humanitarian situation in his own country. Even amidst the Shah’s many reforms, the underclass of Iranian society showed little upward mobility.[40] In addition, the civil rights and political freedoms in Iran under the Shah were generally regarded as deplorable. Although the midd= le class in Iranian society grew steadily, the extent to which Iranians could conduct collective political action was extremely limited. The historic liberal opposition to= the Shah, the National Front, was almost completely shut out of the political process.[41] The Iranian secret police, SAVAK, = would arrest political opponents without cause, imprison them, and sentence them without trial.[42] Traditional political uprisings and protests through the media were also ruthlessly suppressed. This environment created a climate= of fear that helped to secure the Shah’s power. Much of the technical apparatuses = that SAVAK used to gather intelligence and repress political opponents of the Sh= ah were supplied by the U.S.[43] As the Shah’s power waned in 1970s, SAVAK became increasingly violent; assassinations, bombings, staged fires, and torture were all used to discourage Iranians from acting in opposition to the Shah. This = led Amnesty International to declare in 1975 that “no country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran.”[44] For many years, the Shah got away = with brutal governing tactics because the U.S. supported his regime. However, by 1977, this era appeare= d to be coming to an end as Carter’s human rights policy spoke directly to= the type of humanitarian and civil rights violations that the Shah had relied on for years to maintain authority.

In the early months of his presidency, Carter did not publicly address the Shah’s human rights violations, saving his concerns for private conversations. Carter realized that he had to cho= ose his public pronouncements carefully, lest he jeopardize American’s considerable interests in Iran. As a confidential State Department memo explained, “A frontal attack by = the United States government on the human rights situation in Iran will backfire.”[45] However, the Shah took notice that Carter was dissimilar in many ways to most other Cold War-era presidents. Carter’s vow to promote human rights in every corner of the globe signaled to the Shah that his special relationship with the U.S. might be affected. The first major sign of this chang= e was the decision to restructure arms sales to Tehran.[46] To help ensure that his government’s relationship with the U.S. did not wane, the Shah began = to relax restrictions against political protesters in the spring of 1977.[47] Iran’s liberal nationalists = took this as an opportunity to “start their campaign against repression.”[48] In June of 1977, three members of Iran’s liberal movement published a short letter demanding “the respect of constitutionalism and human rights.”[49] In addition, the newly revived Ira= nian intellectual circle known as the “Writers Association” publishe= d a similar letter signed by forty members later in the month. As one of the signers of the second letter stated, “The government wouldn’t dare jail us in the pre= sent climate on human rights.”[50] Many liberal opposition groups beg= an to meet regularly and publicly. = SAVAK and other security forces were arresting fewer protestors and were employing less violent tactics than in previous years.[51] The relaxation of repression due to Carter’s human rights policy allowed the liberal opposition a chance = to grow and flourish. The member= s of these groups varied in occupation and ranged from doctors and lawyers to writers, intellectuals, and other professionals.[52] The common goal of these groups wa= s to force the Shah to put an end to his despotic practices and uphold Iran̵= 7;s 1906 Constitution.[53]

In addition to relaxing repression and allowing for some measures of peaceful protest, the Shah also responded to the Carter administration’s private pressures that International Red Cross volunteers be allowed to inspect Iran’s human rights situation.[54] In the summer of 1977, as the Shah allowed the Red Cross access to Iranian prisons and Iranian courts, the Car= ter administration began to take notice.[55] As a confidential memo stated in t= he summer of 1977, the Carter administration was pleased by the Shah’s “recent significantly more open approach to human rights matters.R= 21;[56] Another state department official = also noted that the Shah had made “significant and important developments = in the field of human rights” that year.[57] It was clear that the Shah was at = least trying to meet the human rights principles that Vance articulated in his Ap= ril speech. Because of this, Carter’s relationship with the Shah began to improve by the fall of 1977. The administration beli= eved that the Shah was moving in a liberal direction and Carter believed that it= was safe to work out a new arms deal with Tehran.[58] Of course, the Shah’s reform= s were largely for show, as he desperately tried to avoid falling out of Washington’s favor. In = the same vein, Carter granted the Shah a great deal of leniency because of the unique relationship between the two nations. As a classified memo titled “= ;Human Rights Goals – Iran” stated in the first part of 1978, “U= .S. interests in Iran must be seen against a complex set of factors,” whi= ch included “the unusually broad and valuable relationship between the t= wo countries” and “Iran’s ancient tradition of authoritarian government.”[59] By framing the relationship with I= ran in this context, the Carter administration enabled the Shah to view his relationship with Washington as purely interest-based and not pursuant on Iran’s commitment to human rights.&n= bsp; The Carter administration also intentionally refrained from keeping human rights-related data on Iran in order to put off having to take action against Tehran.[60] The Shah would not have to democra= tize, as long as he was saving political face by meeting Carter’s minimum h= uman rights guidelines and was protecting American interests in the region. This type of relationship would sp= ell trouble for both leaders in the second half of Carter’s term.

The warming of relations between Carter and the Shah allowed both leaders to go ahead with the Shah’s scheduled year-end visit to Washington in November of 1977. Amidst a barrage of protest outsid= e the White House, the two leaders met inside for talks that mainly focused on oi= l, weapons deals, and the economic issues of the world.[61] The Shah’s human rights prac= tices were touched upon but were in no way the main focus of the talks. This agenda was hardly in line with Carter’s public pronouncement that human rights were his administration’s top foreign policy priority. Following the November talks, the = White House released a statement to the press indicating that “the two men = had reviewed the positive steps Iran was taking on the matter of human rights.”[62] A secret State Department paper addressed to Carter stated that “the Shah left Washington ‘profoundly satisfied’ with the results of his talks with you” and that he was equally “gratified by your strong reiterat= ion of the special relationship with his country.”[63] This illustrates how the president= and the Shah were mutually relieved that human rights had not gotten in the way= of seemingly more important matters, such as oil prices.

Much of the same sentiments were expressed during Carter’s New Year’s visit to Tehran. In preparation for the trip, the D= eputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, addressed a memo to Carter outlining five imperative American foreign policy objectives relating to Iran that Ca= rter was encouraged to pursue in his talks with the Shah.[64] They included energy and oil conce= rns, nuclear cooperation, and Middle East stability. Christopher’s last listed objective was human rights concerns, and only as they related to maintaining Iranian law and order. The low priority given to human rights would continue during the actual visit. Even as Iran’s human rights situation was once again deteriorating in the last three months of 1977, Ca= rter was encouraged by State Department officials not to pressure the Shah on the issue for fear that the Shah would not “prefer it”.[65] The toughest action Carter was urg= ed to take in regards to human rights in Iran was to “encourage the Shah to continue the positive course” established in the spring and early sum= mer of 1977.[66] During the New Year’s talks, Carter gently broached the subject of human rights and was once again reass= ured by the Shah that his regime was very much concerned with human rights for a= ll of its citizens. This appeare= d to be good enough for Carter, because on New Year’s Eve, he would deliver the greatest praise for the Shah of his presidency. At a state dinner that night, Cart= er toasted the Shah by claiming that “Iran, because of great leadership,= is an island of stability.” Carter continued by stating that the Iranian people loved and admired their leader, and that a “remarkable” transformation had taken place in Iran due to the Shah’s great “wisdom,” “judgment,” and “sensitivity.”[67] Although some of Carter’s hyperbole must be understood in the context of the festive environment, his toast cannot fully be dismissed because it did represent the administration’s reinforcement of its commitment to the Shah.

The friendly manner of the Carter-Shah meetings in November and the new year encouraged the Shah to believe that his relationship with Washington was solidly intact. This allowed the Shah to once again disregard human rights in Iran since he had little fear of reprisal from his lifeline, the United States. Crackdowns on liberal opposition groups by the police and SAVAK inte= nsified in the winter months of 1977, including those on opposition meetings and peaceful protests.[68] The correlation between the Carter= -Shah meetings and an increase in government-sponsored repression appears high. Beating, arrests, and covert viole= nt attacks against “freedom seekers” all increased as 1977 came to= a close.[69] The Muslim wing of opposition fare= d even worse. SAVAK launched a campa= ign in the late months of 1977 and the early months of 1978 to eliminate the leade= rs of “clandestine guerrilla groups.”[70]

However, by the middle of 1= 978 it became clear that the Shah’s strategy had backfired, as the many resistance factions began to join together in order to achieve the common goal of ousting the Shah.[71] The Shah’s violent tactics especially encouraged the poor masses of Iran’s urban centers to join= the emerging Islamic movement. St= ate sponsored repression had encouraged many Iranians to collectively rally aro= und their religious institutions located in large urban areas. Demographically, Iran had transfor= med from a rural nation into an urban one with fifty percent of the total population residing in towns or cities by the late 1970s.[72] This dense concentration of popula= tion “provided the occasion for substantial displays of mass protest” that would not have been possible years before.[73] It also allowed the Islamic moveme= nt to preach its simple message to Iran’s large population of poor Muslims—that the Shah was degrading “Islamic standards of behav= ior and belief” and thus had to be replaced.[74] Religion, according to some histor= ians, was “the most efficient vehicle for channeling the revolutionary mood” among the masses.[75] The liberal opposition did not pos= sess this advantage, as they preached reform messages that most of Iran’s Muslim citizens could not relate to their own circumstances. The outcome in 1978 was that Iran’s liberal movement weakened while the Islamic movement gained strength.[76] The result for Carter was a nightm= arish scenario, as his “island of stability” was about to become anyt= hing but.

Although the liberal oppone= nts of the Shah were not fond of America’s historic intervention in Irani= an affairs, their yearnings for a liberal and democratic society matched up we= ll with Carter’s human rights policy and America’s founding princi= ples. In contrast, the radical Islamic movement expressed no desire to modernize Iran or embrace liberal reforms.[77] As the Shah continued to waver on = human rights, and as the religious movement gained strength, the question over why Carter was not able to shift course and endorse Iran’s moderate liber= al reformers remains. As explain= ed earlier, liberal nationalists originally considered Carter’s human ri= ghts policy to be an opportunity for mobilization. The tactics of these liberal oppos= ition groups were almost completely non-violent, and its members consisted of professional and intellectual citizens.&nb= sp; They professed their displeasure by writing pamphlets, demonstrating= in small groups, and publishing newspapers.[78] This non-violent civil disobedience should have appealed to a man like Carter, whose own personal experiences included a southern upbringing in the midst of the American civil rights movement. The liberal opposit= ion of Iran gave Carter an opportunity to fully implement his human rights policy = and support a much needed and peaceful regime change in Iran. The public principles of Carter= 217;s human rights policy, as stated by Vance in April of 1977, were very much consistent with the demands of Iran’s liberal opposition. However, these reasons were not en= ough for Carter to terminate his relationship with the Shah. The Shah may have been a world cla= ss human rights violator, but he had been the safe option for many years. Carter, like his predecessors, was reluctant to give up on America’s friend and ally.<= /p>

Both Carter and the Shah we= re caught off guard in the latter part of 1978 when protests in Iran began to bolster popular resentment.[79] One of the reasons for this was the reliance of Carter and the Shah on SAVAK intelligence briefings. Because the U.S. Foreign Service, including the CIA, did not collect data on Iran in order to hide human righ= ts violations, SAVAK became the eyes and ears for the conditions on the ground= .[80] The reason for the lack of U.S.-pr= oduced intelligence is because Carter remained adamant in allowing the Shah to work out his internal problems without covert or direct American interference.[81] However, this stance led to flawed intelligence that only told the Shah what he wanted to hear, which in turn misled American foreign policy makers as well. As an intelligence briefing summar= ized from September 1978: “the Shah is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years.”[82] In disgust over such a misevaluati= on, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives would later state in a study on Iranian intelligence that “no reports based on contacts with the religious opposition had appeared” before late 1977, and that “there was absolutely no reporting on the internal situation during t= he first quarter of 1978.”[83] Carter’s inaction on Iranian matters was directly connected to the misleading intelligence reports he received, which led him to believe that the Shah had accepted the message of promoting human rights and that political opposition in Iran was still mode= rate and peaceful in nature. In addition, these reports encouraged the perception that the Shah’s pow= er was firm. However, as 1978 ca= me to an end, this fallacy began to reveal itself. As far back as January 1977, before Carter’s inauguration, the State Department produced a policy paper stating that a “smooth transfer of power” in Iran was unlikely after the fall or death of the Shah because of Tehran’s reliance on “one man” leadership.[84] The fact that Carter knew this but= did not take steps to line up a proper successor in Iran shows that he had been misinformed of the real political situation. Even Carter, whose close personal = ties to the Shah have been well documented, would likely have withdrawn his supp= ort earlier if he was aware that the Shah’s government was on the brink of collapse. <= /p>

However, by the end of 1978, even misleading intelligence reports could not mask the truth. Protests were increasingly turning= into violent unrest, and the Shah’s security forces became reluctant to us= e force to suppress them.[85] Amidst this turmoil, Carter finally began to publicly distance himself from the Shah. In December 1978, he stated that although his administration would “prefer the Shah to maintain a major role in the government,” it was “in the hands of the Iranian people” and he would not intervene with U.S. forces to bail out the S= hah.[86] Carter’s sentiments signaled= the death knell for the Iranian leader as he could no longer rely on the Americ= an umbrella to keep him safe. As= 1979 began, it was too late for Carter to distance the U.S. from Iran’s problems—the historical relationship between the two nations was too = deep and his own words and actions had been too supportive of the Shah. The Islamic movement led by Ayatol= lah Khomeini referenced the Shah’s closeness with America as a way of agitating the Iranian masses and bolstering the revolution.[87] By the end of the next year, an Is= lamic Republic was solidly established in Tehran, and the Shah was receiving trea= ting for his cancer in exile.

The Shah had served as America’s greatest and most important ally in the region. He had allowed the U.S. cheap and unrestricted access to Iran’s oil, and had presided over a long perio= d of Middle East stability. Howeve= r, with the Shah out of power, America suddenly appeared vulnerable. Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter was forced to institute the “Carter Doctrine” in his 1980 State of the Union address. In it, he warned that “an at= tempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.”[88] Carter’s early pronouncement= s were correct: the U.S. had entered a new period in history. However, it was not an era in which outdated Cold War ideologies would be replaced with new liberal foreign initiatives, such as human rights. Instead, as historian Andrew Bacevich explains, the last two years of Carter’s presidency marked the beginning of a new effort on the part = of American foreign policy makers to “guarantee the ever-increasing affluence” of American society, meaning the protection of AmericaR= 17;s access to cheap Middle Eastern oil.[89] Since the U.S. had lost their most reliable ally in the Middle East, American leaders felt compelled to forcef= ully defend its interests in the region in the years that followed. In the face of such momentous prob= lems, it is easy to understand why Carter’s human rights policy in Iran has been misrepresented and even forgotten about.

Carter’s human rights policy also failed in Iran because, much to his chagrin, it could not escape the boundaries or the ideologies of the Cold War. As stated previously in this essay, Carter believed that America had entered a new phase in foreign relations u= pon his election in 1976. He beli= eved that the traditional fight against Soviet communism had become outdated and unnecessarily taxing to the U.S., both in dollars and in American effort. However, even before the fall of t= he Shah and the Carter Doctrine, Carter’s foreign policy in practice was still framed around the same concerns as his predecessors. Carter’s promotion of human = rights indirectly supported the “realpolitik” doctrine he sought to escape. Although professing different rhetoric in public, Carter’s secret correspondence within h= is administration was littered with references to the Soviet threat and containing communism. As Frank Ninkovich explains, “human rights, because they epitomized the enormous contrast between = the ways of life created by the two ideologies, was also useful as a symbolic w= ay of fighting the Cold War.”[90] Since Carter practiced a foreign p= olicy very similar to that of his Cold War predecessors, he could have framed hum= an rights as a tool of fighting global communism. But by insisting that his foreign = policy and human rights initiatives existed outside of the Cold War, Carter confus= ed foreign governments and alienated the very groups that a pro-human rights policy was best suited for. Iran’s liberal opposition is a perfect example. Carter could never bring himself to support Iran’s liberal nationalist movement as a successor regime, ev= en though his human rights policy appeared to speak directly to what they were advocating for. The leftist leanings of the liberal opposition and their supposed sympathies to communi= sts could never be accepted by Carter or any American foreign policy maker.[91] This was predetermined by traditio= nal Cold War concerns, whether Carter acknowledged it or not. Similarly, and following perfectly= with the doctrine of “realpolitik,” Carter put aside his moralistic impulses in Iran because of the Soviet Union’s geographical proximity= and the desire for regional stability.[92] For the first twenty-five years of= the Cold War, the U.S. had formed a “special commitment” to the Mid= dle East by supporting especially oppressive monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabi= a.[93] Carter was in no way ready for Ame= rica to withdrawal its historic support from such oil-rich nations, even if their leaders blatantly continued to deny human rights. Once again, Carter’s human r= ights policy was halted by Cold War realities and American interests. In the last two years of his presi= dency, Carter would be forced to publicly embrace his failures and accept the continued existence of the Cold War. The Carter Doctrine, which came on the heels of the Soviet invasion = in Afghanistan and the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis, put Carter into the uncomfortable position of ratcheting up military spending and admitting that the Cold War had not yet reached a conclusion.[94]

The result of this was a foreign policy and a president that appeared inconsistent and indecisive. The great moral principles that had driven his entire life seemed lost in Carter’s last two years in offi= ce, as he was forced to go against his initial policy of human rights and reinvigorate the Cold War. Ho= wever, this does not mean his administration’s human rights policy was direc= ted by empty idealism. As biograp= her Peter Bourne states, “Carter was guided by a consistent set of values= and beliefs” that remained with him for his entire life, including while = he was president.[95] Carter was not a political “flip-flopper,” nor did he hastily throw together different policies in hopes that something positive would result.[96] Carter was a firm proponent of hum= an rights and remains so to the present day.&= nbsp; His human rights policy has been much maligned and yet Carter has ne= ver regretted it; ideological consistency has never been his problem. However, Carter ultimately fell sh= ort because, for over half of his presidency, he refused to acknowledge that he= was a Cold War president. Similar= ly, and for various reasons, Carter could not change course in his official Ira= nian policy, even as the Iranian revolution engulfed and destroyed the Shah̵= 7;s regime. His human rights poli= cy appeared to give his administration a great opportunity to end America̵= 7;s client relationship with Iran and to formulate a new Middle East policy for= the post-Cold War world Carter envisioned.&nbs= p; However, Carter, like most other Cold War presidents, could not comm= it to the unknown and felt it was safer to continue the foreign policy already= in place. The fear of being responsible for losing Iran, what historian Frank Ninkovich would define as= the fear of a “terrible failure,” moved Carter to continue America’s support for the anemic Shah.[97] A regime change did eventually com= e to Iran, but it came in the form of a revolution that was unfavorable to the interests of the U.S. Even am= idst these outcomes, Carter stated in his memoirs that the effectiveness of his human rights policy should not always have been measured by “inches, pounds, or dollars”; better judgments of him were to be found in the “revival of hope” and the “lifting of the human spirit= 221; in oppressed peoples.[98] If this standard was universally ap= plied, than Carter’s human rights policy in Iran was, in part, a success. Carter’s human rights policy= did revive hope in Iran’s liberal opposition. However, because of the Cold War a= nd America’s historic relationship with the Shah, Carter could not follow their “hope” and “human spirit” for liberalization = all the way through. Thus, the fa= ilure of the United States in Iran became the failure of Jimmy Carter as well.

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