Donald Caldwell

The = Value of Social Capital to

the = Future of Iraq[1]<= o:p>

Donald Caldwell

Political Science

This is a critical, yet hopeful, survey of the v= alue of social capital to understanding the prevailing conditions in Iraq. The abundance of failures and pauc= ity of progress in promoting a peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraq can be direct= ly attributed to the lack of social capital between United States reconstructi= on representatives, the U.S. military and Iraqi civilians. The utility of social capital to t= he future of Iraq will be demonstrated in the following relationship: As social capital between the U.S. military, U.S. reconstruction authorities, and com= mon Iraqis increases, the security and overall quality of life for Iraqis will increas= e.

Iraq is listed second, just ahead of Somalia and behind Sudan, in Foreign Policy’s influential “Failed States In= dex for 2007.” Seventy-five percent of Iraqis describe the state of security in Iraq as “poorR= 21; (IRI, 2006, 29). Iraqis do no= t have access to basic services including electricity, food, or even potable water because of this lack of security. Four million Iraqis are considered “food insecure and in need = of food assistance” (UNAMI, 2007, 2).&n= bsp; Only one in three children in Iraq under the age of five has access = to safe drinking water (UNICEF, 2007). More than 80,000 Iraqi citizens have lost their lives since the inva= sion of 2003 (Iraq Body Count, 2007). Over 4,000 coalition troops have suffered the same fate (icasualties, 2007). More importantly to our study, common citizens do not trust their neighbors, the coalition and Iraqi security forces trying to protect them, or their representatives in government. Indeed, most would agree with a recent CSIS report claiming that the central government is less and less relevant to what happens in Iraq (CSIS, 2007). The fundamental source of conflict= in Iraq is doubtless the “competition among ethnic and sectarian communi= ties for power and resources” (Petreaus Report, 2007, 2). Iraqis and U.S. analysts alike are asking the same question: how= did we get to this point?

American policy errors ran the gamut from politi= cal miscalculation and economic misallocation to social misunderstanding and military mismanagement. Past mistakes in policy formulation and implementation will offer us a portal through which to see the position social capital occupied in the reconstruc= tion equation. Social capital is b= oth an index of the overall conditions in Iraq and a vehicle for improvement. It is the hope of the author that a= ny lessons or warnings gleaned from this analysis will be applied to mitigating suffering and promoting understanding in future circumstances.

Policy error and military failure combined to re= press the formation of social capital, in many cases even eroding existing social= capital, and directly contributed to civil strife in Iraq. Economic liberalization was priori= tized over stability. A centralized= and callous decision-making apparatus was favored by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The misunderstandi= ngs between Iraqis and coalition forces stemming from a complete lack of adequa= te training (particularly in cultural sensitivity), and copious misapplication= s of US power and resources illustrated the unpreparedness of the US military to= be part of a nation-building effort. An assessment of social capital offers a more compelling explanation for the violence and continued instability in Iraq than political incompetence or economic stagnation. National reconciliation, seized upon by figures in the US public as the key to succe= ss in Iraq, is possible not through political initiative, but by a surge of so= cial capital.

This will not be an exhaustive study of all that= went wrong in Iraq or even a general exploration of the efficacy of political policies, as taken by both the Iraqi and US governments. This will be a focused study, trea= ting political decisions, military strategies, and economic policies only in so = much as they are directly relevant to the formation or erosion of social capital. There will be no discussion of the reasons to go to war in Iraq, nor any recommendation of t= he criteria for intervention. The United = States, for reasons of obligation and capability, will be treated as the primary ag= ent for change. As the security a= nd political situation continues to evolve the Iraqi government will take over= the mantle of primary effecter but with 130,000 foreign occupying troops still present we are not yet at that stage.

Conceptually, this paper will rely on the theory= of social capital as described by the eminent sociologist Robert D. Putnam in = his 2000 work, Bowling Alone. Putnam concentrates on the decline of church attendance, volunteering, membership = in groups, letter writing, and even league bowling. While data exist on the amount of television Iraqis watch per day,[2] and even the type of programming they favor, our discussion of social capit= al in Iraq will depend on other evidentiary assets. This study will depend on informal evidence, supporting anecdotal information with quantitative data when available and appropriate. First-hand accounts, like those of former Iraqi minister of defense = Ayed Allawi and front-line news reporters Michael Yon and Nir Rosen, will comple= ment statistically based policy recommendations offered by the World Bank and th= e UN Assistance Mission in Iraq. T= he value of social capital to the economy of Iraq will be explored through the official polices of US reconstruction authorities and, as a counterpoint, t= he informal economy studies of Robert Looney.= Security will be a consuming theme in this work and will be treated through the use of independent security contractors. The role of the military in promot= ing social capital will be considered through the counterinsurgency strategies = of General David H. Petraeus. Ca= se-studies, including the Local Governance Program and USAID educational reform, will a= lso figure prominently.

Social capital is the value wrought from social networks. An increase or decr= ease in social connections between people, both of a quantitative and qualitative nature, affects the nature of the relationship between those groups and individuals. There are two ty= pes of social capital, “bonding” and “bridging” (Putnam, 2= 000, 22). Bonding forces tend to insulate a group, composed of people with common interests, ethnicity, or o= ther distinction, from interacting with dissimilar groups. Bridging forces, as one would expe= ct, create opportunities for interactions between diverse groups. It would not be an overstatement t= o say that the reconciliation of the Iraqi people depends squarely on the ability= of US troops and civil society representatives to facilitate the creation of bridging social capital between disparate factions.

The endemic violence saturating US headlines and= Iraqi lives in 2006 and 2007, whether resulting from sectarian feud, transnational terrorist activity, or insurgent uprising, will be approached with an eye toward the formation and erosion of social capital. Al Qaeda, the numerous Shia and Su= nni sectarian militias, and Kurdish organizations like the PKK all represent gr= oups formed out of bonding social capital. These exclusionist groups fill the vacuums left by local government = and non-governmental organizations by providing “crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community, while furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labor for local entrep= reneurs” (Putnam, 2000, 22). A potenti= al problem with bonding social capital is that by encouraging “strong in-group loyalty, [it] may also create strong out-group antagonism” (Putnam, 2000, 23). In a coun= try occupied by foreign soldiers and teetering on the brink of mass sectarian violence, it is easy to see how groups formed out of bonding forces have sl= id into violent extremism. Psychologists have contemplated this shift, suggesting that the “black and white nature of most extremist ideologies is often attract= ive to those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of navigating a complicated world” (Borum, 2004, 26). The Army’s new counterinsurg= ency manual reinforces this basis for attraction:

Recruits are often young men suffering from frus= trated hopes and unable to improve their lot in life. The insurgent group provides them identity, purpose, and community in addition to physical, economic, and psy= chological identity. (COIN, 2006, 21)

Social capital is a dynamic force that can be manipulated to incite violence just = as easily as it can be used to mitigate it.&n= bsp;

Several decisions were made in the immediate aft= ermath of the invasion of Iraq that determined the priority social capital was to occupy in the course of the conflict. Some of the most egregious errors include a lack of appreciation for= the nuanced history of Iraq’s diverse communities, a stubborn attachment = to preconceived (read American) ideas of progress, the adoption of a top-down = and highly centralized interpretation of government, an unwillingness to explore diverse or creative solutions, and the emphasizing of economic liberalizati= on and political party development over civil society. The decision to disband the Iraqi = Army in the wake of the capitulation of Saddam’s forces is where we will start. The disbandment of the= Iraqi Army was based on several presumptions:&nb= sp; that the army was a representation and tool of the Baath party, that= the Iraqi people did not trust the army, and that if the army was left intact t= he Baath party and all its associated dictatorial connotations would survive as well (Bremer, 2007). What Paul Bremer, Donald Rumsfeld, and the rest of the Bush administration failed to include in their calculus was the value of the Iraqi Army as an existing se= t of social connections. Their fix= ation with the Baath party as a monolithic set of Saddam supporters blinded them = to the potential usefulness of leaving this social network intact. Keeping the Iraqi Army would not h= ave heralded a return to the Saddam regime, but rather would have demonstrated = to the Iraqi people that America was not going to unilaterally impose its will. Engaging with the Iraqi= Army, and vetting it of genuine Baathist war criminals in the process, would have given us a pipeline rich in social capital and authenticated our promise to listen to the needs of the Iraqi people.&n= bsp; Clearly, the Bush administration did not study the lessons of the Vietnam War, namely that “actions directed at one ‘audienceR= 17; might affect others in an undesirable way” (Gaddis, 2004, 231). The dismissed Baathist Army Office= rs were doubtless the same people that organized and participated in the early, and continuing, stages of the insurgency in Iraq. By “wiping the slate clean&#= 8221; we exposed our weaknesses, shortcomings, and general bewilderment; the R= 20;total strangeness of the Iraqi social, political, institutional, and economic landscape” (Allawi, 2007, 127). The effect was that we increasingly drove ourselves into a “physical and psychological ghetto” (Allawi, 2007, 127). The disbandment of the Iraqi Army = ensured we started off in a ghetto of social capital.

The security void left in the wake of the disban= dment of the Iraqi Army was enormous. A single Iraqi Army battalion existed seven months after the fall of Baghdad (Slevin, 2003). This security= void was to be filled only partially by enlisted American military personnel. The rest would be shouldered by independent security contractors. In the study of social capital, security is one of the foundational blocks that must be present for more involved exercises to take place. Security and insurance costs, 20 t= o 40 percent of contracts by some estimates, have greatly diminished the impact = of reconstruction projects (International Bank, 2005). Social capital teaches us that col= lective security projects can create positive externalities. After all, if someone ensures your safety, whether a defense contractor or a neighborhood watch, you benefit e= ven if you “spend most of [your] time on the road and never even nod to another resident on the street” (Putnam, 2000, 20). These immediate positives, however= , must be weighed against the long-term negatives of using independent security contractors. Unlike United St= ates military and reconstruction representatives, independent security contracto= rs are held accountable to few and operate under a minimalist definition of du= ty and obligation. That is to sa= y, contractors work to satisfy the conditions of their contract. As representatives of the US gover= nment and the American people, the military and diplomatic personnel are held to a higher standard and commit themselves to broader definitions of duty and obligation. More directly, se= curity contractors can be highly corrosive to social capital because they are not connected to the Iraqi people, and because they disrupt attempts to build social capital among Iraqis and US soldiers through their shoot-first mentality.

A House Oversight and Government Reform Committe= e memo found that the security contractor Blackwater fired first in 80 percent of = the shooting incidents (House, 2007). Iraqis are terrified of Blackwater and other independent security contractors. As a heavily arm= ed force with little to no oversight and a propensity to fire first, it’= s no wonder why. Many indepe= ndent security employees are former U.S., British, or Australian soldiers. Often sporting weapons and body ar= mor similar to that of U.S. troops, it is easy to see how Iraqis could become confused. On a visceral level= one wonders what this does to their level of trust in the intentions of the Uni= ted States, as well as the ability of US forces to protect them.

As= a response to calls for greater oversight, a recent agreement between the Pen= tagon and State Department spelled out rules and guidelines for the use of private security contractors. It also= allowed for contractors to be punished under US criminal law (Jelinek, 2007). This is an errant attempt to bring= a force corrosive to social capital to heel. Not all contractors, and certainly not all their employees, are Amer= ican or even US-based. Why would t= hey then fall under the jurisdiction of US criminal law? And, why only security contractors= ? Why don’t translators or rec= onstruction contractors fall under US law as well?&nbs= p; Iraqi authorities have demanded that private contractors be subjecte= d to Iraqi law. Rather than allow = the Iraqi government to show their people, and the rest of the world, that they= are not impotent puppets to the coalition, US officials have ignored them as if they were children asking for their allowance. While due process may be an evolvi= ng concept in the Iraqi legal system, US representatives must recognize that I= raqi courts are the appropriate mechanism by which independent contractors, now enjoying a status akin to the British in Egypt under the Capitulations agreement, can be reconnected to the society they have wronged.

Pe= rforming the duties of a defense contractor is a very challenging task. The recently posted contract for t= he Ministry of the Interior requests that the winning contractor be able to possess the following materials and be able to perform the following tasks: trainers must have armed guards and armored SUVs for prompt transportation, they must develop a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and have a QRF of their own = able to respond in less than 10 minutes, the contractor must supply dog teams for explosive detection and crowd control, and the contractor must be able to communicate in Arabic or provide an interpreter (Pincus, 2007). Nowhere in this help-wanted advertisement is there a requirement for the contractors to have the “best interests of the Iraqi nation at heart” or even for the contractors to “promote democratic values.” Independent security contractors a= re simply responding to demand, filling a void left by the inadequate numbers = of formal protection available. = US diplomatic officials and their Iraqi counterparts use independent security contractors because of their ease of availability and ease of implementation (Stratfor, 2007).[3] In other words, security contracto= rs are more economically and politically efficient. Our mission in Iraq has to be abou= t more than efficiency. Independent security contractors are self-interested.&= nbsp; When the welfare of a nation is at stake, however, there must be safeguards against the “subordination of strategic interests to those= of the organization implementing the strategy” (Gaddis, 2004, 233). In short, the proliferation of civ= ic values through social connections isn’t in the job description for defense contractors. Independ= ent security contractors, born out of poor policy decisions by the US administration and the preoccupation of the US military with economic efficiency, have had an undeniably negative effect on social capital format= ion in Iraq.

The Bush Administration’s obsession with economic liberalism was not limited to the world-wide advocation of a free market approach, failed health care plans, or free trade policies. The crass and presumptuous economic policies the US Occupation Authorities enforced in Iraq prioritized economic capital at the expense of social capital.&= nbsp; World Bank officials, seemingly oblivious to the potential for civil unrest during an occupation by a foreign military, claimed that in post-war Iraq “economic efficiency of public expenditures would move to the ce= nter stage” (Edirinsighe, 2004, 66). US representatives presumed economic growth would placate the Iraqi public, ignorant of the fact that “businessmen had a very low reputat= ion in Iraq” (Allawi, 2007, 380). Acculturated in Saddam’s domination of the public sphere, Iraq= is were naturally accustomed to seeing merchants “described by the government and the media as greedy, grasping, and steeped in unethical prac= tices” (Allawi, 2007, 380). Keeping = the UN Oil-for-Food scandal in mind, it’s easy to see how Iraqis doubted the altruism of US economic initiatives. Social protection is the key to the food marketing system in Iraq, t= his fact cannot be overstated. The Public Distribution System (PDS), instituted by Saddam Hussein as a respons= e to US sanctions, is the source of food for many Iraqis. The World Bank saw the danger in t= hat “at least half the poor (25% of the population) are almost fully dependent on the PDS transfers,” and acknowledged that a “break= down in the food transfer-marketing system” would be the “worst thing that could happen in the transitional situation Iraq is facing now” (Edirinsighe, 2004, 13).

The proposed solution to the economic efficiencies permeating the food marketing system in Iraq, increasing private control over food marketing in Iraq, was impractical and negligent considering the security situation in Iraq. Widespread fear and distrust stemm= ing from the insurgency was multiplied by the failure of US authorities to secu= re the wheat and cereal Iraqis depended on to survive. The US failed to see the potential= value of social capital in the situation. The PDS was not obsolete or irrelevant now that sanctions had been lifted, as claimed by World Bank officials (Edirinsinghe, 2004, 11). Taking over the PDS, origina= lly designed to assure “basic food security to the entire population, and [maintain] political stability (Edirinsinghe, 2004, 66),” would have = immediately given US soldiers an avenue to display their commitment to Iraqi communities. In 2007 US soldi= ers in Baqoubah finally got to do what one soldier called “the most important thing we’ve done” (Lair, 2007). After fighting back Al-Qaeda the US military assumed the duties of the PDS and delivered 560 tons of wheat to people in the Diyala province. Not knowing exactly how the system worked soldiers learned through interaction:=

The system of what people expect was learned thr= ough long conversations with local sheikhs and government officials, often in smoke-filled offices over cups of chai or seated around the family living r= ooms of local leaders. (Lair, 2007)

The obtuse economic policies of the US Occupation Authorities, oriented towards macroeconomic growth instead of the improvement of the daily lives of Iraqi= s, is just another instance of the devaluation of social capital in Iraq.

The violent fluctuations of the Iraqi economy and inability of the government to provide for the basic services of its citize= ns led to the creation of an informal economy in Iraq. In this way the development of an informal economy in Iraq followed a “pattern seen in other parts of t= he world—the informal economy tends to grow during periods of political, economic, and social crises” (Looney, 2006, 4). US economic analysts have been slo= w to pick up on the relevance and implications of the informal economy. Without a doubt attempts must be m= ade to “integrate the analysis and qualification of the informal economy int= o an overall review of economic and military developments in Iraq” (Looney, 2006, 4). The potential for insurgent groups to penetrate and use informal economies to their advantage must be counseled. An informal economy, arising out of an environment of uncertainty and distrust, depends= on limited trust networks between friends and family. Extended trust networks, networks = of social capital in which “individuals enter into a transaction with on= ly limited information about the counterpart’s specific attributes,̶= 1; are the key to developing the economy in Iraq (Looney, 2006, 9):=

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The key challenge facing the economy is developi= ng the conditions conducive to the creation and growth of extended trust networks = to encourage the growth and development of this type of networking. (Looney, 2= 006, 16)

The centralized, top-down approach of US economic policy-makers and implementers must be abandoned for one that is “decentralized and inclusive” (Looney, 2006, 27). In short,= it must be recognized that when economic and political activity is “embe= dded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism and malfeasance are reduced” (Putnam, 2000, 21).

The reconstruction of Iraq’s educational s= ystem was another battlefield to be won or lost by Washington’s decision makers= . The US Agency for International Development was well aware of this and instituted a program in which “= ;in a one-year period, USAID rehabilitated about 2,400 schools, nearly one-fift= h of Iraq’s schools, and distributed nearly nine million science and math textbooks” (Allawi, 2007, 382). Nevertheless the program was the subject of much criticism, acutely after it was a revealed a “large portion of the textbook contracts we= re awarded to printers outside Iraq” (Allawi, 2007, 383). Education is central in the proces= s of socialization. The classroom is the factory of hu= man capital and facilitator of social capital.= In Iraq fewer and fewer children were going to school. It was reported that only “2= 8% of Iraq’s graduation-age population (17 year olds) in the centre and sou= th sat their final exams in 2007 (2006/2007 school year), according to the Min= istry of Education” (UNAMI, 2007). The pressures of the civil unrest in Iraq clearly affected the performance of those that did stay: “Of those who sat the exams only = 40 percent passed, a decrease from 60 percent passed in 2006” (UNAMI, 20= 07). Some of the older students who lef= t the classroom joined the insurgency while the rest stayed at home, afraid to venture outside of the relative safety of their homes. This is a clear erosion of social capital; the true debt caused by this education gap may not be incurred for years. Strategies to combat t= his slippery slope exist, such as “sowing dissent among radicals” a= nd “intervening in schools, churches, and prisons to prevent radicalizat= ion” (Summit, 2005). Even somethin= g as small as the content of textbooks can have national repercussions:

The content of textbooks became a leit-motif of = the Iraqi condition. Issues of secularism and religion, the privileged position of Islam in society, liber= al values versus traditional cultures, co-existence of Arab and Kurdish nationalisms, the varying Shi’a and Sunni interpretations of historic= al and religious issues—the list went to the heart of the Iraqi dilemma. (Allawi, 2007, 384)

A discussion of social capital in Iraq without considering religion would be negligent.&n= bsp; Religion in Iraq was not a subject to go wanting in both Iraqi and US forums of discussion. Under t= he Baathist regime religion was mostly secularized. Right under the surface, however, = was a devout community of believers. Unfortunately most of the attention has been diverted to the role of religion in the political institutions of Iraq. Statistics like “49% of Iraqis choose clerics or religious lea= ders as their first choice for the drafters of their constitution (by comparison only 13.9% designated their political party representatives as their first choice) (IRI, 2005, 28)” grab US headlines but do not contribute to t= he understanding of the high levels of violence in Iraq. Our discussion centers on the role= of religion as an impetus to the formation of social capital. Islam must be approached not as ju= st a faith or a collection of practices but as an “identity and loyalty—for many an identity and loyalty that transcends all others” (Lewis, 2003, 17).[4] In the cauldron of violence and illegitimacy of Iraq, “religious observance became a matter of affirm= ing one’s particular identity, transcending other considerations and scru= ples” (Allawi, 2007, 384).

Religious leaders and groups are the gatekeepers= of legitimacy in Iraq. Through t= he adulations and admonitions of imams on the day of prayer (Friday), the fate= s of many nascent political and civil society projects are decided. Religious groups are also the arbi= ters of information, sharing stories about a community’s history that “provide models of how actions and consequences are linked and are of= ten the basis for strategies, actions and interpretation of the intentions of o= ther actors” (COIN, 2006, 21). Religious councils and organizations represent a point of inflection= for social capital. That is to sa= y, they are a latent network of social connections that can be spurned or included. Bernard Rougier, a = French sociologist, was a witness to the indoctrination of extremist groups in Lebanon. Rougier spent five y= ears living among Palestinian refugees in the most densely populated Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. He n= oted the transformation of identity in extremist groups caused by the=

real-time production of salafist-jihadist ideolo= gy, the way preachers played a decisive role in reframing social reality exclusively in religious categories, and the deep changes that those networ= ks effect in perceptions of self and other. (Rougier, 2007, 22)

A similar transformation has occurred in Iraq. As a function of social capital, religion in Iraq must be treated with sensitivity and must always be engage= d in dialogue.

Fundamentalists and extremist groups manipulate = social capital and religion for their own purposes. They deny affiliation with or symp= athy towards a larger national Iraqi cause and tend to adopt an encompassing worldview that affirms their exalted position as compared to the masses (Antoun, 2001). At times they manipulate this position to portray themselves as the “voice of the people,” while at other times they distance themselves to emphasize t= heir purity of purpose (Antoun, 2001). For extremist groups it is less in the religious character of their message itself than in how persuasive it is. As others have observed, Osama Bin Laden’s success in advocating violence lies not in his religious piet= y, but in his ability to construct and articulate a “consistent, convinc= ing case that an attack on Islam is under way and is being led and directed by America” (Scheuer, 2005, 7). <= /span>For extremist groups violent action became an injunction from God, impossible to ignore. Insurgents, likewise,= were held together by “family loyalties, tribal affiliations or a commitment to= an extreme form of Islamism” (Allawi, 2007, 180). US strategizers failed to realize = that “action in defense of identity and authenticity can be more fundament= al than action in defense of interests” (Thomas, 2003, 32).

Preventing the radicalization of disaffected Ira= qis will depend on initiatives similar to a plan the United Kingdom Department = for Communities and Local Government developed concentrating on promoting shared values including faith based platforms, supporting local solutions, creating forums on extremism, and engaging areas of radicalization like religious schools by monitoring curricula (Preventing, 2007). It will also depend on the develop= ment of democratic institutions as avenues of expression that can reduce tensions. In Crimea the minor= ity Muslim Tartars were able to avert ethno-religious conflict by relying on th= eir existing democratic structures. The leaders of the Tartar legislative body, or Mejlis, were challenged by radic= als but “swiftly silenced the radicals with popular tolerance and educati= on campaigns at local mosques” (Ziad, Chomiak, 2007).<= /p>

This paper seeks to convince all relevant actors= of the value of social capital in Iraq by constructively analyzing the mistakes and failures made by the US military and Occupation Authorities, as well as highlighting the areas of progress. In the second half of 2007 sectarian violence began to decline and t= he overall security situation in Iraq tentatively began to improve (Petreaus Report, 2007). While these re= sults may be preliminary, this paper will treat these improvements in peace and stability as an identifiable trend. This reversal of course can be attributed to the encouragement of so= cial capital between US personnel and Iraqis on a daily basis. How well these gains are consolida= ted will depend on the proper assessment of policies with social capital as the cornerstone.

It is difficult to point to an event or date that signified the beginning of the insurgency in Iraq. Regardless, the insurgency offers a window into the psyche of the Iraqi people. In 2005, 48 percent of Iraqis felt= their country was headed in the right direction (IRI, 2005). In 2006 only 41 percent replied in= the affirmative and 19 percent said they didn’t know if their country was headed in the right direction, an increase of almost 8 percent over the previous year (IRI, 2006). Ho= w the US has responded to the insurgency, from General Ricardo Sanchez to General David Petraeus, will weigh heavily in our discussion of the value of social capital in Iraq. <= /span>

Iraq has been a testing ground for the preparedn= ess of the US military for counterinsurgencies, a type of asymmetrical warfare that most analysts agree will dominate the coming decades. Reciprocity and trust are key conc= epts in understanding social capital. Trust is an often precarious game of give and take, depending on the ability of the individual to “subordinate their own interests to thos= e of larger groups and to associate and cooperate with each to achieve economic purposes and other social satisfactions” (Looney, 2006, 9). Reciprocity and trust are social n= orms that can be understood to be phenomena driven by interaction, and as commodities “purchased” with credibility.&= nbsp; Therefore, in order to increase the social capital of a network involving skeptical groups, it is necessary to build trust and demonstrate commitment. In short, with re= gards to the US military and the insurgents, the Iraqi people will continuously a= sk “who will help them more, hurt them less, stay the longest, earn their trust” (Sewall, xxi). <= o:p>

Facing a tenuous and foreign environment, and un= der heavy pressure to keep casualties to a minimum, the US military under General San= chez adopted a “round them up and ask questions later” policy that certainly came back to haunt them. <= /span>The majority of American troops stayed in large air-conditioned bases stationed= 50 miles outside of major population centers.= Cultural misunderstandings and general uncertainty create doubt as to the intentions of an intervening force.&nb= sp; US Marines, still toting their weapons and wearing their boots, walk= ed into mosques during Friday prayers and mistakenly bound and handcuffed men = in front of their families (Rosen, 2005).&nbs= p; In a culture based on patriarchy and tribal understandings of reputation, mistaken captures and interrogations became grave and unforgiva= ble insults. The US military fail= ed to prevent the conditions leading to the insurgency, failed to identify the violence in Iraq as a popularly supported insurgency, and until recently fo= ught a myopic campaign emphasizing tactical victories over a cohesive counterinsurgency strategy. I= ncreasing social capital between US forces and the Iraqi public would reduce uncertai= nty and allow intentions to be more clearly conveyed.

Since General Petraeus took over on 26 January 2= 007 as the commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, the US military has adop= ted a counterinsurgency strategy. Counterinsurgency warfare must be appreciated as the “most complex and maddening type of war” imaginable (Sewall, 2007). Host governments risk legitimacy by relying on troops to win the sup= port of their public. Although civ= il society organizations and the military often share the same goals, namely to “stabilize and rebuild a country to the point where it no longer needs outside assistance,” they often perceive each other as having competi= ng agendas (Taft, 2006, 10). Eve= n the capacity of those institutions specializing in diplomacy and dialogue, like= the US Department of State, is in question when considering the rigorous demand= s of a counterinsurgency campaign: “One fact sums it up: more people play = in Army bands than serve in the US foreign service” (Sewall, 2007, xxx).= Ground forces, in the absence of adequate support, must be prepared to assume the roles of “mayor, tra= sh collector, and public works employer” (Sewall, 2007, xxxi). Counterinsurgency strategies repre= sent a stark departure from accepted military approaches:

Conventional US doctrine has implicitly justified collateral damage in the name of decisive victory: while overwhelming force= may inadvertently harm more noncombatants initially, it ultimately serves a humanitarian purpose by ending hostilities sooner. (Sewall, 2007, xxviii)

The Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming and decisive offensive force has= almost no utility in counterinsurgency warfare.&n= bsp; In fact, the utility of force will decline the more you use it. The safety of the troops themselve= s is secondary to that of the population. Because insurgents often act in order to provoke retaliation, inacti= on may be the best response for the counterinsurgent. All of this amounts to blasphemy in light of conventional military doctrine.&n= bsp;

Social protection, including the restoration of = basic services, food security, and even “freedom from disease and the restoration of human dignity,” is paramount to a counterinsurgency ca= mpaign (Taft, 2005, 8). While humani= tarian interventions continue to have some hold on the conscience of the American public, counterinsurgency campaigns would not inspire the increasing militarization of American foreign policy.= The level of commitment on all levels a counterinsurgency campaign requires, in the way of human, technological, and especially psychological capital, strongly cautions against wars of opportunity.[5] It is without question that one of= the things the Counterinsurgency Manual hopes to impress upon the reader is that “if we wish to succeed with any approximation of honor, counterinsurg= ency will demand more than we are accustomed to giving” (Sewall, 2007, xxxviii).

Counterinsurgency strategy amounts to nothing le= ss than an operationalizing of social capital. The tactics can range from issuing marines guides for cultural awareness (so-called “smart cards”) covering important ethnicities and religious holidays (Marine Corps, 2006),= [6] to a complete redesign of the deployment of American troops. General Petraeus saw the error in keeping his troops cooped up in large “enduring bases” in that “if military forces stay locked up in compounds, they lose touch with= the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurge= nts” (COIN, 2007, 31). The insurge= ncy targeted segments of the population which were likely to swing the support = of the general people, including doctors, professors, and lecturers (Allawi, 2007).[7] Petraeus ordered his troops to liv= e and operate in the neighborhoods they would have to protect, thereby adopting a strategy that “reinforces the connections with the people that establ= ish real legitimacy” (COIN, 2007, 31).

In order to combat insurgent groups, which can be considered organizations competing for the support of the people, military commanders must “identify cleavages between groups and cross-cutting = ties (for example, religious alignments that cut across ethnic differences)̶= 1; (COIN, 2007, 51). Combating insurgencies also means persuading the population through what the military calls “psychological operations,” in other words propaganda. The psychological operations of th= e US military have lagged behind the increasingly sophisticated propaganda used = by the insurgents. The competing propaganda of insurgents can be seen as the outward face of an ideology. Army commanders have pondered the attributes of ideology, stating it provides a “prism, including a vocabulary and analytical categories, through which the situation is assessed” (COIN, 2007, 21). This same ideology can also “shape the movement’s organization and operational methods” (COIN, 2007, 21). Intelligence collection was another challenging process in Iraq. = The conditions in Iraq severely hampered conventional intelligence collection b= eing as “officers of the CIA could not freely travel without conspicuous a= rmed bodyguards” (Allawi, 2007, 127).&nbs= p; Intelligence in a counterinsurgency, generally regarded as the purvi= ew of the specialist, [8] inst= ead becomes the duty of every soldier (COIN, 2007).

In counterinsurgency campaigns the military must persuade the general population that it is there for their benefit. The military in effect adopts a patron-client relationship in which “an individual in a powerful posi= tion provides goods, services, or other resources to followers in exchange for political support or loyalty, amassing power” (COIN, 2007, 55). In Anbar, Diyala, and various other provinces of Iraq, local militias have been incorporated into counterinsurg= ency security plans as “Concerned Local Nationals.” In Anbar, the result has been particularly dramatic. Monthly attack levels have declined from “some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year” (Petraeus, 2007, 4). This was a direct result of the ab= ility of the military to secure the support of the local populace. In Baqoubah a former insurgent gro= up, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, participated in patrols of their own communit= ies with US soldiers (Yon, 2007). Tribal sheiks and former insurgent groups joined forces with the military in defia= nce of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and as an expression of the increasing social capital between US troops and Iraqi citizens. Policy makers would be rash to assume that the improved security in Anbar and other areas of Iraq was the result of US military strategy. As common enemies were identified = and common goals agreed upon, a symbiotic relationship coalesced between the US military and Iraqis.

In some ways the military has embraced the analy= sis of social capital. The military = assesses the potential of insurgent organizations by graphing their social network.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> This social network graph is based= on the dyad, two nodes on a single line representing a connection between two people. Links between nodes (people) are categorized by the nature of their relationship: “kinship (brother of), role based (boss of), affective (likes), interactive (prays w= ith, demonstrates with), and affiliation (same clan, club)” (COIN, 2007, 2= 15). Military planners can also use this graph to assess the viability of the insurgency in more general terms.[9] While couched in different languag= e this social network graph amounts to nothing less than an operational depiction = of the value of social capital to fighting the insurgency in Iraq.<= /span>

The success of a counterinsurgency plan will dep= end on how well it is implemented by the military, coordinated with the host government, complemented by civil society organizations, and accepted by the population. We come full circ= le in realizing that a counterinsurgency plan, the most inclusive and flexible of= any military strategy, has its limits. Counterinsurgency doctrine is a vehicle, a means to an end and an implicit acquiescence to the “primacy of politics” (Sewall, 200= 7, xliii).

While largely concentrating on the average citiz= en, counterinsurgency doctrine also recommends the creation of “coordinat= ing mechanisms, such as committees or liaison elements to facilitate cooperation and build trust with HN [Host Nation] authorities” (COIN, 2007, 40).<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> These elements would assist implementation of other strategies by “reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings while removing impediments” (COIN, 2007, 40). The weakness of the central govern= ment contributed towards the propensity for Iraqis to seek assistance and redress grievances through the many civil society organizations operating in Iraq, = including 32 international humanitarian NGOs (UNAMI, 2007). The counterinsurgency manual direc= tly recognized the value of civil society organizations when listing as one of = its broad indicators of progress the “presence or absence of associations…formation and presence of multiple political parties, independent, professional associations, and trade unions” (COIN, 2007, 107). The Counterinsurgency M= anual also addressed both the beneficial and detrimental potential of the media.[10] In the absence of a local council, military commanders are to help fill the void.

Encourage the populace to create such a body. Teachers, businessmen, and others = who enjoy the respect of the community should be strongly encouraged to come together and form a temporary council to serve in such capacity until a more permanent organization can be elected. (COIN, 2007, 95)

Civil society organizations, like the Fund for Peace, have recognized the value of their own expertise in training peacekeepers to develop cultural sensitivit= ies and offering historical background to conflicts (Taft, 2005).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are a mod= el of civil-military cooperation (Taft, 2006).&n= bsp; These PRTs have been used in Afghanistan and are increasingly being employed in Iraq. In Afghanis= tan PRTs consisted of coalition and NATO elements alongside “50 to 300 tr= oops as well as representatives from multinational development and diplomatic agencies” (COIN, 2007, 44). PRTs are a creative step forward in utilizing social capital in war zones. Similarly, the “Human Terrain System”, a project embedding anthropologists and sociologists with US Army regiments in “human terrain teams,” is an attempt to strengthen the bonds of the social network working for the betterment of Ir= aq (Rohde, 2007). Anthropologist= s are experts in the analysis of social forces.&= nbsp; Their use in Afghanistan and Iraq is an attempt to increase social capital between the military and the population through expertise.[11] Provincial Reconstruction Teams an= d the Human Terrain System represent progress in the use of social capital for the improvement of Iraq. Their tr= ue impact will depend on the level of support they enjoy from US reconstruction officials and the US military.

A more illustrative case for the value of social capital may be found in the mixed results of the Local Governance Project.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The Local Governance Project (LGP)= was an umbrella initiative that included the “establishment of representa= tive councils, service delivery capacity-building, civil society strengthening, decentralization policy development and civic dialogue” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 1). The potential of th= e LGP was enormous. Local councils = could be crucial in fostering a broader sense of community responsibility and in identifying needs and concerns. Council members would be empowered to use their position as a mechan= ism of change “in addressing their concerns by reaching out to a variety = of sources” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 12).&nb= sp; The success of these councils depended on the constant reinforcement= of social capital. The number of citizens participating in Baghdad neighborhood council elections increased = as “experience accumulated and the process and objectives became better known” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 10). The LGP has also benefited existing= civil society groups by reinforcing “social capital through increasing opportunities for communication and knowledge transfer among social and eth= nic groups” (Brinkeroff, 2005, 11).

The LGP had several success stories worth noting= . It succeeded in assisting the Association of Disabled Veterans in al-Basrah in rehabilitating a community facility for physical therapy, training and recreation. The LGP also helped pool the resou= rces of groups with common interests as it did in Kirkuk in August 2003 with the support of a conference on civil society development. In Karbala, LGP staff “provi= ded training to the Iraqi Human Rights Watch and the Former Prisoners and Famil= ies of Victims Association to organize outreach and dissemination workshopsR= 21; (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 7). =

The LGP ran into several obstacles that greatly attenuated its long-term contributions to a peaceful and stable Iraq. The first was a built-in illegitim= acy due to its foreign origins; some even saw them as an American import (Brinkerhoff, 2005). The application of local governance projects also carried with them an inherent contradiction: “fulfilling targets mandated by CPA [Coalition Provisi= onal Authority] to keep to the programmatic script for Iraq’s reconstructi= on, while building local government and civil society and responding to local demand” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 3). In other words, the LGP had to serve too many masters. Dialogue sessions moderated under = the auspices of the LGP were effective “largely due to the ability of the facilitators to express these concepts within an Iraqi context, confronting different ways in which Islam, tribalism, and Arab and Iraqi could be defin= ed in ways that made them compatible with democracy” (Brinkerhoff, 2005,= 9). This was seemingly lost on donors = to the LGP who typically exercised excessive control, sacrificing long-term legiti= macy for “short-term engineered outcomes that accord with their predetermi= ned preferences” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 14).

Scholars of social capital have observed that the greater the interpretation of vertical linkages and horizontal bridging soc= ial capital, the more likely it is that a society will possess inclusive and democratic institutions that foster cohesiveness and conflict mediation (Colletta and Cullen, 2000). = The lesson of the Local Governance Project is that viable governance in Iraq depends on the restoration of vertical social capital, reconnecting citizens with government in a constructive manner, and encouraging bridging capital across sectarian lines (Brinkerhoff, 2005).

In the end social capital is only a tool. How well we use this tool will dep= end on how well we learn from past failures, build on instances of success, and pl= an for the future. While it is h= ard to argue against increasing security and quality of life for Iraqis through so= cial capital, there exist influential competing alternatives. The most popular is the partitioni= ng of Iraq along sectarian lines. S= cholars argue that the US must put aside any “preconceived notion about prefe= rred outcomes, such as multinational democracy, and accept a more workable outco= me” (Baker, 2007, 11). This “Union of Iraqi States” would ensure the peaceful and stable co= existence of all of Iraq’s proud communities and allow US troops to withdraw (Baker, 2007). While American= s may support this partition plan because of frustration with current approaches, it igno= res the wishes of the Iraqi people. When asked of the importance of the establishment of a unity governm= ent to the future peace and stability of Iraq, 89 percent described this as extremely important (IRI, 2006, 22). More directly, 66 percent of Iraqis strongly disagreed with the “segregation of Iraqis according to religious or ethnic lines” (IRI, 2006, 40). It is highly doubtful that a segregation of Iraqis, against their will and necessitating military action, would redress the longstanding grievances the communities = of Iraq have against one another or produce a peaceful and stable society.

The future of Iraq will be highly dependent on t= he role social capital plays in the national reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. The American militar= y and reconstruction apparatus have not completely ignored social capital to date. Rather, their policies = could be accurately described as sporadically supportive, frequently erosive, and generally dismissive. The Uni= ted States has a unique obligation and lone ability to effect deep change in Iraq. If the United States is= to leave behind a viable government and stable society in Iraq it must readjust its policies and reallocate its resources to reflect the centrality of soci= al capital formation.

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